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/. JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction conferred by Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(j) as a case transferred to the Court of Appealsfromthe Utah Supreme Court.
//. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Appellant Sittner's appeal of the Third District Court's summary judgment
presents the following issues for review:
1.

Does a Utah judgment lien attached to a debtor's real property before he files

bankruptcy and receives a discharge remain enforceable against the property following case
closing and abandonment of the property back to the debtor?
2.

Did Sittner'sfilingof a bankruptcy claim marked "unsecured" his signing of

a stipulation with the bankruptcy trustee waiving any right to assert a secured claim in
property or funds of the estate, but preserving his rights respecting property abandoned by
the estate or not administered by closing, and his receiving a distribution from the estate to
unsecured claims have the effect of waiving Sittner's judgment lien on property abandoned
to debtor Gildea upon case closing?
3.

Did the eight year statute of limitations for enforcing Sittner's Utah judgment

expire during the pendency of this action?
4.

Did the trial judge err in awarding Defendants attorney's fees under Utah Code

Ann. §78-27-56 for Sittner filing an action for declaratory relief?

1

5.

Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in not granting Sittner's motion to strike

portions of Defendants' memoranda that contained opinions of other judges, offered to
support Defendants' third motion for summary judgment and in considering such opinions
in reversing himself for the third time and granting summary judgment?

///. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Sittner's appeal is from the trial court's grant of summary judgment of dismissal and
awarding attorney's fees and accordingly the applicable standard of review for issues one through
five is that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because entitlement to summary judgment is a
question of law, no deference is accorded the trial court's resolution of legal issues presented. This
court determines only if the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial
court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Id. In reviewing summary
judgment, this court views the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the losing party [Sittner]. Id. at 233. Also applicable to Sittner's appeal of the
summary judgment, the trial court should not makefindingsof fact in a summary judgment other
than a restatement of the undisputed facts stated in favor of the non-moving party. Dubois v. Grand
Central, 872 R2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App. 1994).
The standard of review for issue number six on the trial court's failure to grant Sittner's
motion to strike and preclude consideration of the opinion of the bankruptcy court after the
bankruptcy order was reversed and vacated by the U.S. District Court is equivalent to a

2

determination of the admissibility of evidence for purposes of a motion for summary judgment and
is reviewed by an abuse of discretion standard. Ratline v Barker, 912 P.2d 433,441 (Utah 1996).
IV. DETERMINA TIVE ST A TUTES
Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1 (1992) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously satisfied
or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with law.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
In November 1985, Sittner obtained a money judgment against Defendant Bruce

Gildea. In December of 1985, Sittner had execution proceedings issue on the judgment and
the county sheriff recorded a notice of real estate levy and set an execution sale on the
judgment lien on Gildea's real property, which sale was suspended when Gildea filed
bankruptcy in January 1986. In bankruptcy, Gildea received a Chapter 7 discharge of
personal liability, elected and received his Utah homestead exemption on property other than
the Sittner judgment lien property. The lien property was scheduled in the bankruptcy, but
was neither sold nor administered for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and Gildea
continued to be in possession and an owner after the bankruptcy case closing in April 1992.
On August 3,1993, Sittnerfiledthis action in the district court under the Declaratory
Judgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1, et. seq., for declaratory relief that his judgment
lien was still attached to the real property, survived Gildea's bankruptcy, had an unsatisfied
judgment balance in excess of $30,000, that Gildea could not claim another homestead and
3

Sittner was entitled to direct the sheriff to complete the execution sale suspended by Gildea's
prior bankruptcy, and for a determination of Defendants' rights, interests and priorities in the
property. [Complaint, Rec, l-ll; copy Appdx. 1],
Gildeas' answer admitted Gildea's homestead exemption had been used on other
property, that Gildea was still an owner in continuous possession, and that the property had
been abandoned to himfromthe bankruptcy estate, but asserted that Sittnefs lien claim was
barred by Gildea's Chapter 7 bankruptcy and by the statute of limitations. [Gildeas' Answer,
Rec,30-33 ]. The other Defendants answered, admitted having an interest in the property,
but asserted that Sittner's lien was discharged by Gildea's bankruptcy and barred by the
statute of limitations. [See answers, Rec. 34-43],
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition,
After some written discovery, cross-motions for summary judgment were filed and on

May 18,1994, Judge Wilkinson granted summary judgment for Defendants dismissing the
action [Rec, 331] concluding that judgments do not survive a bankruptcy discharge [Tr. p.3,
Rec. 273], and awarding Defendants attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann, §78-27-56 saying
that Sittner's "suit is not well taken, is afrivoloussuit,,.." with no mention of or finding of
bad faith. [Tr, p. 3,4, Rec. 213-21A],
Subsequently on Plaintiff Sittner's motion, the court reconsidered its ruling and on
September 7, 1994, the court entered an order vacating the prior summary judgment and
granting partial summary judgment for Sittner that his judgment and lien survived the
bankruptcy and remained enforceable in rem against the subject property, concluding that

4

a discharge does not render a judgment lien invalid but only precludes liability of the debtor
personally, nor was the judgment avoided in the course of Giidea's bankruptcy or by the prior
stipulation made between Sittner and Gildea's bankruptcy trustee which expressly preserved
the judgment lien on the specific real property which was the subject of the action. The court
reserved ruling on the statute of limitations and on the amount remaining due on the
judgment. [See Order, Rec. 458-464; copy Appdx. 2\.
On March 10, 1995, Sittner moved for partial summary judgment on the reserved
issues of the statute of limitations and the balance due on the judgment, and requested the
court to authorize the sheriff to complete the execution sale long suspended by Gildea's
bankruptcy. [Rec. 469-488]. Schriever in response reasserted her entire first motion for
summary judgment [Rec. 510-525], but after the motions were submitted for decision [Rec.
550], Gildea moved for a stay of proceedings so he could move to reopen his bankruptcy case
and seek relief in the bankruptcy court and by Minute Entry of April 21, 1995, Judge
Wilkinson granted the stay. [Rec. 567].
Gildea was successful in obtaining a bankruptcy order adverse to Plaintiff Sittner and
based thereon on August 15,1995 (the trial court) granted Defendants' summary judgment
of dismissal and awarded them attorneys' fees. [Rec. 735]. However on October 10,1995,
Sittner obtained an order staying further proceedings pending review of the bankruptcy order
by the U.S. District Court and providing that if the bankruptcy order was reversed that the
trial court's judgment,findingsand conclusions of August 15,1995, that were based on issue

5

preclusion, would be automatically vacated andftirtherproceedings could then ensue in the
case. [Rec. 939-941 and Rec. 1000-1002; copy Appdx. 3].
On July 16,1996, the U.S. District Court reversed and vacated the bankruptcy order.
[Rec. 1042-1045]. Unfortunately the court's opinion included unnecessary commentary
endorsing the bankruptcy's judge's conclusions.
On August 8, 1996, Sittner served requests for supplementation of prior discovery
responses and after receiving no responses and sending inquiry letters to opposing counsel
with no response; on October 24,1996, Sittner moved to compel discovery and for an award
of attorney's fees. [Rec. 945-970]. All such discovery motions were submitted for decision
of the court by notice on November 14, 1996 [Rec. 1003] and December 10, 1996 [Rec.
1053].
On January 14,1997, Schrieverfiledher third motion for summary judgment offering
no new facts or analysis other than including the bankruptcy judge's opinion and federal
district judge's endorsement of it, and based thereon asserted Defendants' right to have the
prior summary judgment reinstated. [Rec. 1061-1126]. Giidea joined in the motion [Rec.
1141]. Sittner responded by objecting to and moving to strike the unfounded facts and
improper conclusions under Rule 56(e) and the improper bankruptcy opinions and again
moved for summary judgment on the reserved issues. [Rec. 1154-1237].
On March 25,1997, the court granted summary judgment for Defendants dismissing
Sittner's complaint with prejudice and awarding attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. §7826-56 in an amount to be determined.

[Judgment, Rec. 1257-1258, Findings and
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Conclusions, Rec. 1250-1255; copies Appdx. 4]. The court's third reversal of decision was
brought about by the nullified bankruptcy opinion improperly included by Defendants in their
brief, which was the only new ground asserted, which they argued strenuously [Tr. 1644,
p.6,7], which Judge Wilkinson admitted considering in reaching his decision that Sittner's
judgment was waived in Gildea's bankruptcy. [See Tr. p. 4, Rec. 1245-1249, copy Appdx.
5]. On October 21, 1997, judgment was entered awarding Defendants' attorneys' fees of
$37,250 [Rec. 1541-1543]. On November 14,1997, Sittner filed a Notice of Appeal from
the entire judgment and proceedings, including the March 25, 1997, summary judgment.
[Rec. 1549].
C.

Appellate Proceedings and Disposition.
In December of 1997, Schriever moved for summary dismissal of Sittner's appeal as

untimely filed. In January of 1998, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the appeal and
pending motion to the court of appeals. On July 9, 1998, the court of appeals filed a
memorandum decision [Rec. 1573] dismissing Sittner's appeal as untimely. Sittner filed a
petition for rehearing and after the court called for and reviewed responses, rehearing was
denied by order of September 30,1998.
Sittner petitioned for certiorari which was granted by the Supreme Court and on May
19,2000, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded this
case back for a full review of the merits of Sittner's appeal. Sittner v. Schriever, et aL, 2000
UT 45 [copy Appdx. 6].

7

D.

Statement of Facts.
Sittner responded to the statement of facts set forth in Schriever's third motion for

summary judgment by objecting to certain unfounded facts and improper conclusions and
moving to strike the same under Rule 56(e) [Rec. 1154-1164]. Some of these unfounded
facts and improper conclusions are in the findings of fact adopted by the court [Rec. 12501255]. However because resolution was by summary judgment, Sittner ignores the findings
and particularly the improper portions and asserts that the undisputed facts properly in the
record for summary judgment are as follows:
1.

On November 25, 1985, Sittner was granted judgment for recovery of

approximately $34,000 against Bruce Gildea, which was filed and docketed in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. [Exhibit "B" to Sittner's Complaint, Rec. 10;
admitted in Gildea's Answer, ^|6, Rec. 31].
2.

Under Utah law, docketing the judgment created a lien upon Gildeas' real

property in Salt Lake County, including a lien upon Gildeas' one-half ownership interest in
property at 2400 East 3000 South (the "subject property") Gildea and his wife were
purchasing from Defendant Hale under a uniform real estate contract. [Admitted Gildeas'
Answer %5, Rec. 31; Rec. 1070, %\ ].
3.

Sittner caused execution proceedings to issue on the judgment and on

December 30,1985, the county sheriff filed for record with the Salt Lake County Recorder
a Writ of Execution and Notice of Real Estate Levy against Gildea's interest in the subject
property and the sheriff served the Writ on Gildeas and posted and published notice of

8

execution sale. [Exhibit "C" to Plaintiffs Complaint, Rec. 12-15; Mabey Aff. p , Rec. 135138].
4.

On January 16, 1986, just before Sittner's execution sale of the subject

property, Bruce Gildea filed for bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District
of Utah. [GillmanAff. %L9 Rec. 93].
5.

As a result of Gildea's bankruptcy filing, Sittner's attorney received notice of

the "automatic stay" preventing the execution sale of the subject property and he notified the
sheriff to suspend further proceedings until the automatic stay was no longer in effect.
[Mabey Aff. f4, Rec. 135-138].
6.

Early in the bankruptcy case, Sittner filed a standard form "Proof of Claim9'

which attached a copy of Sittner's judgment against Gildea as evidencing the debt and
indicated the judgment was security for the claim, but marked the claim box as "unsecured"
based upon Sittner's belief that the security interest then had no recoverable value to satisfy
the judgment. [Gillman Aff. | 3 , Rec. 93-95; copy Proof of Claim, Rec. 95 and Appdx. 7].
7.

On December 14,1987, Gildea received a Chapter 7 discharge [Rec. 99], and

during his bankruptcy case, Gildea elected to use and receive the full benefit of his Utah
homestead exemption on property other than the subject property. [Admitted in Gildeas'
Answer ^10, Rec. 31].
8.

In June of 1989, Gildea's bankruptcy trustee commenced an adversary

proceeding against Sittner seeking to avoid Sittner's judgment lien as a preferential transfer
under 11 U.S.C. §547. The action was settled by written stipulation signed by Sittner and

9

the trustee on August 10,1989, whereby Sittner agreed to waive anyrightto assert a secured
claim in property or proceeds of the bankruptcy estate, and agreed he would have an
unsecured prepetition claim for claims administration, but Sittner'srightsunder the judgment
respecting property abandoned by the estate or not administered by closing would be
preserved and unaffected. The stipulation was subject to court approval and was approved
by a bankruptcy order. [Gillman Aff. f4, Rec. 94, copy Stipulation, Rec. 98-99 and copy in
Appdx. 8; Mabey Aff. f s 5,6, 7, Rec. 135-138].
9.

In December of 1991, Sittner received a checkfromthe bankruptcy trustee for

$4,033 representing a distribution on Sittner's unsecured claim of $36,228 [Rec. 1072 at f9;
Rec. 1121]. After Sittner applied the distribution to the judgment debt, there still remained
a balance owed in excess of $30,000. [Sittner Aff. f5, Rec. 130-131].
10.

The subject property and Gildea's interest in it was a scheduled asset of

Gildea's bankruptcy estate [Rec. 1071 at ^[4] and throughout the case Gildea remained in
possession and after closing Gildea continued to be an owner of the one-half interest in the
subject property. [Admitted in Gildea's Answer \\ 2, Rec. 32; and Rec. 1074 at Tf 16].
11.

The subject property was not sold by the trustee or otherwise administered for

the benefit of the estate, since the trustee had determined that there was not sufficient equity
available to benefit the estate and he intended to abandon the property, but no formal order
of abandonment was made or entered and so it was deemed abandoned to Gildea upon
bankruptcy case closing on April 24,1992. [Sittner Aff. ^f's 6 and 7, Rec. 130-132; Mabey
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Aff. f8, Rec. 137-138; Gildea admitted property abandoned to him in Gildeas' Answer f 11,
Rec. 32].
12.

Several months after the closure of Gildea's bankruptcy case, Sittner decided

to complete the long-suspended execution sale on the subject property and thus obtained a
search of the public title records and discovered a warranty deed recorded August 1992 from
Defendant Hale as grantor conveying the subject property to Defendant Schriever, Shirlynn
Gildea's sister, which made no reference to or exception from the warranties for Gildeas'
ownership. Sittner investigatedfartherand found that Gildeas were still in possession of the
subject property. [See Complaint ^[13 and Exhibit "A" (Warranty Deed), Rec. 4, 9;
Schriever's drawer If's 13,19, Rec. 36].
13.

Given the title uncertainty created by the Hale to Schriever warranty deed not

conforming to the prior uniform real estate contract under which Gildeas were purchasing
at the time Sittner's lien attached, Sittner deemed it prudent to file the present action on
August 3,1993, for declaratory relief and for the court to direct completion of the execution
sale proceedings, joining Gildeas, Hale and Schriever who appeared to have an interest in
the property and seeking a determination of their rights, interests and priorities. Sittner also
included a "Count IF claim for fraudulent transfer declaratory relief in case Defendants
claimed that Gildea had lost his ownership in the property by contract foreclosure or
forfeiture [Complaint, Rec. 1-17; copy Appdx. 1].
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

Under federal law, a debtor's bankruptcy discharge does not void a judgment

lien attached to a debtor's real property but only extinguishes one mode of enforcing the
judgment, namely personal liability of the debtor, leaving intact another mode the right to
enforce the judgment in rem against the property. Thus generally liens that are not
affirmatively avoided during a bankruptcy case pass through and are unaffected and remain
enforceable. Continued enforcement of a judgment lien depends upon state law and under
the Utah Judgment Act the judgment continues for eight years unless earlier satisfied by
payment. A Utah judgment is not dependent upon the continuation of personal liability of
the debtor for enforcement so the judgment is not voided or rendered unenforceable by a
debtor's discharge, since the judgment lien stays with the property to which it is attached and
may be enforced after transfer to a third party by execution to collect the judgment debt.
B.( 1) Under the Bankruptcy Code a judgment lien is a property interest that does not
become property of the estate and cannot be avoided except under a power conferred by the
Bankruptcy Code and then only by affirmative relief in the case. Since no order voided
Sittner's judgment lien, it was not extinguished in the bankruptcy.
(2) The Bankruptcy Code classifies claims as "secured^ or "unsecured^ based
upon the value of the collateral securing the claim. So a creditor's claim can be unsecured
though he has a security interest with little or no value and he can participate fully in
distributions to unsecured claims and still retain his lien interest.
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(3) When property of the bankruptcy estate is abandoned either by the trustee or
by the Bankruptcy Code upon case closing, the property stands as if no bankruptcy petition
had beenfiledand is encumbered by the liens attached prepetition which remain enforceable
on the property.
(4) Under the Bankruptcy Code the trustee is empowered to avoid preferential
transfers like judgment liens taken within ninety days of the petition, but only for property
of benefit to the estate. The trustee filed an action to avoid Sittner's judgment lien, and by
settlement stipulation the parties signed, Sittner agreed the lien was waived on property to
be administered for the benefit of the estate while preserving the lien right on property later
abandoned. The stipulation approved by court order had the effect of fully preserving
Sittner's judgment lien on property abandoned by the estate back to the debtor.
C.

Ordinarily a Utah judgment lien only continues for a period of eight years, but

under Bankruptcy Code §108(c), the limitation period on state judgments is suspended
during the period enforcement is prevented by §362(a), bankruptcy stay. Under the Utah
judgment statute, the limitation period is suspended during the time enforcement is stayed
in accordance with law, which also has the effect of tolling the life of the judgment while
enforcement is prevented by the bankruptcy stay. Gildea's bankruptcy tolled Sittner's
judgment for more than six years. Under Utah case law if enforcement of a judgment is
restrained by a court or is prevented as a practical matter by the assertion of adverse claims
in a judicial proceeding that could defeat the judgment lien, then there is equitable tolling of
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the judgment limitation period during the period enforcement is restrained or prevented,
including appeal of an adverse judgment.
D.

An award of attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 must be based

on specific findings that the claims were unmeritorious meaningfrivolousor without support
in fact or law; and subjective bad faith. An action under the Utah Declaratory Judgments
Act, which by statute is declared to be remedial, to settle controversies and is not open to
objection; cannot support a finding of bad faith by merely commencing the action for to do
otherwise would be repugnant to the legislative intent. The trial court failed to make a
finding of subjective bad faith, instead merely stated a conclusion with no demonstration of
the factual basis to support the conclusion, which is inadequate to establish bad faith. Nor
is there any basis in law or fact for concluding that Sittner's declaratory action was
unmeritorious. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees.
E.

The opinions of other judges are not admissible on a motion for summary

judgment when they are not being offered or considered for issue preclusion or law of the
case. It is an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to admit such opinions in evidence or to
consider them for purposes of a summary judgment.
VII. ARGUMENT
A.

A DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY EXTINGUISHES ONLY THE
DEBTOR'S PERSONAL LIABILITY, BUT NOT THE JUDGMENT
DEBT AND LIEN WHICH MA Y STILL BE ENFORCED IN REM
AGAINST THE LIEN PROPERTY.
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"Under U.C.A., 1953, 78-22-1, a judgment automatically becomes a lien upon all
nonexempt real property of the judgment debtor at the time it is docketed. " Capital Assets
Financial Services v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9,994 P.2d 201,206 (Utah 2000), quoting Taylor
Nat% Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 150,155 (Utah 1982). A judgment lien
attaches to a vendee's beneficial ownership interest under a uniform real estate contract.
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254, 1256 (Utah 1987). In this case, Sittner's
judgment against Bruce Gildea was docketed on November 25,1995, in the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County and automatically attached as a valid perfected lien on Gildea's
one-half ownership interest in the subject property. This is not disputed by Defendants.
Gildea's discharge order necessarily reflects the language of 77 U.S.C. § 524, "Effect
of Discharge", which provides in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge in a case under this title—
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such
judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with
respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944,1141,1228, or 1328 of
this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation
of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor whether or not discharge
of such debt is waived;... [Emphasis Added].
Under the plain language of 77 U.S.C. § 524, a bankruptcy discharge only voids a
judgment to the extent it is a determination of personal liability of the debtor and only enjoins
the commencement or continuation of an action that seeks to collect or recover a discharged
"debt as a personal liability of the debtor. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C § 101(12),
defines "debt" as "liability on a claim", and a discharge extinguishes the debtor's liability.
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In contrast, 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) defines "lien" as a property interest and it is well
settled that a discharge does not void liens which generally survive bankruptcy, nor prohibit
lien enforcement by foreclosure or otherwise after case closing. Johnson v. Home State
Bank 501 U.S. 78,115 L.Ed.2d 66,111 S.Ct. 2150 (1991), holding that a bankruptcy claim
secured by a lien on real property has two components, an in rem component and an in
personam component, and the discharge extinguishes only the in personam mode of
enforcing a claim, while leaving intact the other — namely an action against the debtor in
rem. 115 LJEd.2d at 74,75. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773,116 L.Ed.2d
903 (1992), holding that Congress did not intend to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens
pass through bankruptcy unaffected, nor can liens be stripped off the property to benefit the
discharged debtor, stating, "We think, however, that the creditor's lien stays with the real
property until the foreclosure. " 115 L.Ed.2d at 911,112 S. Ct. at 778. See also Owen v.
Owen, 500 U.S. 305,114 L.Ed.2d 350,111 S.Ct. 1833 (1991); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500
U.S. 291,114L.Ed.2d337,11 S.Ct 1825 (1991); In re Sanders, 39 F.3d 258,260 (10th Cir.
1994) ("Secured debts, including judgment liens . . . generally survive bankruptcy. ");
Chandler Bank of Lions v. Ray, 804 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1986), bank's post-discharge and
case closing action naming the debtor to obtain replevin of its collateral and related relief was
an in rem action, and such actions by secured creditors are not precluded under 11 U.S.C.
§ 524; and see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy \524.02 (15th ed. Rel./1995), state court actions
joining a discharged debtor for the purpose of in rem enforcement of a creditor's lien are not
prohibited by nor a violation of the discharge injunction.
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Clearly then under federal bankruptcy law a discharge does not void or render
unenforceable a prepetition judgment lien on a debtor's property, so it remains to be
determined if Utah law on judgment liens would change the result. See Cox Corp. v. Vertin,
754 R2d 938,940 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring), stating that federal law would
have permitted the survival of a lien on the debtor's property despite the bankruptcy
discharge, but noting that the continued existence of the lien was a question of state law. But
Justice Zimmerman opined, "Under Utah law, once a lien was in place, it continued through
the bankruptcy proceeding and could have been executed upon at anytime until the end of
its statutory eight-year life" Id. at 940.
Cox however involved an action to renew a judgment for an additional eight-year life
which the court held impermissible given the discharge of the debtor. The court reasoned
that a renewal judgment attaches onlyfromthe date of the new judgment and does not relate
back to the original judgment date or extend the prior lien, citing Free v. Farnsworth, 188
P.2d 731 (Utah 1948), and since the renewal judgment under our judgment statute, Utah
Code Ann. §78-22-1, creates a new lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor owned
by him at the time or thereafter acquired during the existence of the lien, that given the effect
of a bankruptcy discharge of liability of a debtor that a judgment could not be renewed. Cox
at 939. Of course Sittner did not seek to renew his judgment lien, but only to enforce it
against specific property to which it had attached pre-bankruptcy petition. Justice
Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Cox is support for the continued enforceability of a Utah
judgment despite the extinguishment of personal liability of the debtor.
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Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(J) provides, "Judgments shall continue for eight years
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance
with law" Since it has already been established that a bankruptcy discharge does not stay
enforcement of a judgment in rem, there is no express restriction in the statute that would
prevent a judgment from continuing despite the extinguishment of personal liability of the
debtor, unless the judgment is satisfied. The term "satisfied** with reference to a debt is
commonly understood to mean "payment", not termination without payment. This is
consistent with the use of the term in Utah R. Civ. P. 58B "Satisfaction of Judgment", which
refers in subpart (b) to being "fully paid*'. Discharge of personal liability is certainly not
satisfaction then and since Sittner's judgment lien was not satisfied and there is no other
statutory restriction, the judgment lien continues.
Also, when a Utah judgment lien is attached to property owned by a debtor, the lien
remains attached and enforceable even after the debtor sells and conveys the property to
another. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1258 (Utah 1987), once a judgment lien
attached to the vendees interest, it continues to be a lien and is not destroyed or impaired by
a vendee's sale or transfer of his interest to a third person, since the judgment debt and lien
follow the property; Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec Bank, 723 P.2d 398 (Utah 1986).
Thus continuation of the judgment and enforceability of the lien on property to which it
attached is not dependent upon collection from the judgment debtor personally, which is
consistent with secured debts generally. Therefore Utah judgments are not dependent upon
continued personal liability of a debtor for lien enforcement and a discharge would not alter
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the result. This view of the continued enforceability of Utah judgments after a bankruptcy
discharge harmonizes them with the result reached by a majority of states on post-bankruptcy
enforceability of their judgments. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d "Judgments" §297.
Accordingly, Sittner's judgment lien survived Gildea's bankruptcy discharge and
remained enforceable against the property and Sittner was not barred by the discharge from
bringing this action to determine the validity and priority of his judgment lien and for the
court to direct execution sale proceedings on the subject property.
B.

A JUDGMENT LIEN ON REAL PROPERTY OF A DEBTOR ISA
PROPERTY INTEREST THAT CAN ONLY BE AVOIDED BY
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AUTHORIZED BY THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE AND SITTNER'S JUDGMENT LIEN WAS NOT WAIVED
OR AVOIDED, BUT WAS EXPRESSLY PRESERVED.

When Judge Wilkinson granted Defendants' third motion for summary judgment,
Sittner's attorney asked him the basis for the ruling, and he answered that he made a
determination on the merits that Sittner's judgment was waived in the prior bankruptcy case,
although he articulated no reasons for such holding [7r. p 4, Rec. 1248].
The judgment does not disclose the basis for the decision and unfortunately even the
improper findings of fact or the conclusions of law offer little additional help. Conclusion
No. 1 says that Sittner knew or should have known that his judgment lien was waived during
Gildea's bankruptcy. This merely repeats the judge's statement without explaining the
reasons for the decision. Conclusion No. 1 also states that Sittner stipulated to avoid the
judgment lien in order to participate in the distribution to unsecured creditors.
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Thus the conclusions of law suggest that Sittner's judgment lien was waived or
avoided in the bankruptcy because he filed an unsecured claim, he entered into a settlement
stipulation with the bankruptcy trustee agreeing he would have an unsecured claim for
claims administration, though he expressly preserved his judgment on property abandoned
by closing and because he received a distribution from the bankruptcy estate on his
unsecured claim.
Therefore these acts must provide the basis under federal bankruptcy law for the
court's summary judgment ruling that Sittner waived his judgment lien in Gildea's
bankruptcy case. The failure of the trial judge to have complied with Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a),
which requires a brief written statement of the grounds for the summary judgment, unfairly
burdens Sittner here. See Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798,
800 (Utah 1992). Of course Sittner will endeavor to defend the claim that he waived his
judgment lien, but this Court should recognize that generally waiver is an affirmative defense
under Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P (not plead here), and it is Defendants' burden to establish the
grounds, and since it was summary judgment to establish them as a matter of law on the
undisputed facts. Conder v. Hunt, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 105, 1 P.3d 558, 563.
1.

A judgment lien on a debtor's real property is a property interest that can
only be avoided by a power conferred in the Bankruptcy Code.
Upon commencement of a bankruptcy case, under 11 U.S.C. §541, only the interest

a debtor has in real property is passed to and becomes property of the estate. A judgment lien
that attached to a debtor's real property prior to the bankruptcy filing only passes to the estate
the debtor's subordinate interest and the judicial lien remains valid and unaffected, unless the
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lien is avoided during the bankruptcy case by a power conferred in the Bankruptcy Code.
Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 111 S.Ct. 1833, 114 L.Ed.2d 350 (1991), "Only where the
Code empowers the court to avoid liens or transfers can an interest originally not within the
estate be passed to the estate, and subsequently (through the claim of an exemption) to the
debtor" 111 S.Ct. at 1836. In Owen, the debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge, and after
case closing, moved to reopen to avoid a prepetition judgment lien remaining on the debtor's
residence, under the authority of 77 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), which permits avoidance of a
judgment lien if necessary to protect a debtor's homestead exemption. Id. at 1835.
There is no dispute that Sittner's judgment became a lien on the subject property
before Gildea's bankruptcy filing. Since the subject property was not sold or otherwise
administered during the case, and Gildea used his full Utah homestead exemption on other
property, and no bankruptcy court order avoided Sittner's lien, under Code §541 and Owen,
Sittner's judgment lien was not even brought into the estate and thus survived and remained
enforceable in rem after case closing.
2.

Sittner's proof of claim was accurate and under the Bankruptcy Code
properly classified as "unsecured" and he was entitled to receive a
distribution on his unsecured claim which did not waive or relinquish his
judgment lien on property not sold to benefit of the estate
Defendants argued to the trial court that the mere fact that Sittner filed a bankruptcy

proof of claim as "unsecured" and received a distribution on his unsecured claim, was
completely inconsistent with having or retaining a judgment lien security interest in any of
the debtor's property and therefore works an estoppel or waiver of Sittner's judgment lien.
Indeed Schriever asserted that Sittner had taken inconsistent positions and was barred by the
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doctrine of judicial estoppel, citing Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980), et. al.,
stating that a party is bound by its judicial declarations and may not contradict them in a
subsequent proceeding involving the same parties and issues. In other words Schriever
argues Sittner cannot have an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy and assert a right to a
secured claim or interest in the present action.
This argument would have basic appeal if common parlance is used to define and
distinguish between "secured' and "unsecured' bankruptcy claims. It seems reasonable that
if you are unsecured that you have no security and if you are secured, then you must have
some security, so viewed in this respect the terms may seem mutually exclusive.
However, the Bankruptcy Code classifies claims based on the value of the collateral
securing the claim. 11 U.S.C §506(d) classifies a claim for all purposes under the Code as
"secured' only to the extent of the value of the property interest subject to the lien securing
the claim, and as "unsecured' to the extent that the creditor's claim is greater than such value.
This means that a debt can be secured by a lien and if the creditor's lien interest in the
property has no recoverable value, then the claim is "unsecured' by Code definition and
classification, even though it is secured by a lien. It also means that a single claim may be
both "secured' and "unsecured' depending on the value of the collateral securing it. See In
re Harrison, 987 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1993), saying:
Subsection (a) of §506 provides that a claim is secured only to the extent of the
value of the property on which the lien is fixed; the remainder of that claim is
considered unsecured. Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart {In re Hart), 923 F.2d
1410,1413 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235,238-39, 109 S. Ct 1026,103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989).
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Under 11 U.S.C. §501 (a) a creditor "may" file a proof of claim, but under B.R.
3002(a) an unsecured creditor must file a proof of claim if the creditor is to receive a
distribution from a Chapter 7 estate. Under Code §502(a) a proof of claim is deemed
allowed absent an objection by a party in interest. Code §502(b) makes provision for
objections to claims, but does not authorize avoidance of liens, even if claims are disallowed.
Sittner filed a proof of claim on the standard bankruptcy form in May, 1986 (copy
Appdx. 7 )} Because Sittner believed that there was no recoverable value to satisfy his
judgment on Gildea's real property, he marked the unsecured claim box. With respect to the
subject property, Sittner's belief that there was no recoverable value after allowing for the
senior encumbrance, was consistent with debtor's schedules and opinion of value and the
bankruptcy's trustee's stated intention to abandon the subject property.
In any event Sittner's proof of claim was completely accurate, not at all misleading
and under the Bankruptcy Code classification of claims for administration, he was fully
entitled to participate in estate distributions on unsecured claims, while retaining his
judgment lien on the subject property which had no recoverable value at the time.

1

Sittner's claim in f2 sets forth the principal amount of the judgment, the interest
accrued to date and the judgment execution costs incurred in proceedings just prior to the
bankruptcy. In %3 of the claim reference is made to the Judgment as the reason the debtor
owes the money and a copy of the Judgment was appended, as requested in f4 of the form.
Paragraph 5 of the form provides, " . . . the only security interest (collateral) held for this
claim is:" and in the blank the term "Judgment" is inserted. In^[6 ofthe claim form, Sittner
placed an "X' in the box for "unsecured" The form provides in <|6 by a footnote to the
"secured' box, "the claim is unsecured except to the extent that the security interest has
value sufficient to satisfy it. "
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Clearly then there is no judicial estoppel because the position Sittner took in the
bankruptcy case with respect to the lien property and in this case are not inconsistent and
certainly nothing in the record of this case suggests that his opinion that there was no
recoverable value at the time he filed his bankruptcy claim was incorrect or inaccurate. In
any event judicial estoppel does not apply except when a party knowingly makes a
misrepresentation under oath or attempts to commit a fraud on the court by taking an
inconsistent position from a prior case. Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913
P.2d 731,734 (Utah 1995). Moreover Sittner has never been asked in this proceeding what
his opinion of the value of Gildea's property was at the time of the prior bankruptcy case, so
he certainly has not taken any position under oath or otherwise inconsistent with his view of
the value in his bankruptcy claim. Also Gildea had better access to information on the value
of his property than Sittner did and this defeats judicial estoppel as well. Id. at 734.
3.

Property abandoned from the estate is treated as if no bankruptcy case had
been filed and remains subject to the liens attached before filing.
Under 11 UXC. §554(a), the bankruptcy trustee after notice and hearing is permitted

to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome or of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate. Section 554(c) provides, "Unless the court orders otherwise, any
property scheduled under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the time
of closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor...".
It is undisputed that the subject property was a scheduled asset in Gildea's bankruptcy,
and although the trustee had expressed his intention to abandon the property before case
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closing, since it had not been abandoned or sold or otherwise administered for the benefit of
the estate by closing, it was abandoned to Gildea upon case closing under §554(c).
When property is abandoned from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to Code §554 it
ceases to be property of the estate and stands as if no bankruptcy petition had been filed and
is subject to the liens that encumbered it prior to the bankruptcy filing. Dewsnup v. Timm
{In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676 (Bkrtcy D. Utah 1988); affirmed 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.
1990); affirmed 502 U.S. 410,112 S.Ct. 773,116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992).
In Dewsnup, the Chapter 7 debtors' real property encumbered by a Utah trust deed
was abandoned by the trustee under Code §554 and the debtors brought an adversary
proceeding seeking to value the collateral pursuant to Code §506(a) to bifurcate the creditors
claim into a secured portion equal to the value of the collateral and an unsecured portion for
the excess and to then strip down the creditors lien under Code §506(d), so that debtor's
could retain the property by merely paying the secured portion. The court held that property
abandoned from the estate is returned to its pre-filing status respecting liens as though no
bankruptcy case had been filed and §506(d) only applied if property is sold or administered
to benefit the estate. Dewsnup, 87 B.R at 683. This result was affirmed by the 10th Circuit,
Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 590, 591.
The U.S. Supreme Court in affirming did so on broader grounds saying, ". . . no
provision of the pre-Code statute permitted involuntary reduction of the amount of a
creditors lien for any reason other than payment on the debt." Dewsnup, 116 L.Ed.2d at
912. Congress enacted the Code with a full understanding of this practice and intended that
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it continue. Id. at 912. The Court said that the creditor's lien stays with the real property
until foreclosure and that this way any increase in value rightly accrues to the benefit of the
creditor and not to the benefit of the debtor or other unsecured creditors. Id. at 911.
The Supreme Court in Dewsnup also considered the debtor's argument that failure to
avoid or strip down the lien unfairly allowed the creditor to retain a security interest in real
property and to participate fully in liquidation dividends as an unsecured creditor. In
rejecting this argument the Court said:
It is true that his participation in the bankruptcy results in his having the
benefit of an allowed unsecured claim as well as his allowed secured claim, but
that does not strike us as proper recompense for what petitioner proposes by
way of elimination of the remainder of the lien. Dewsnup, 116 L.Ed.2d at 911.
While Dewsnup dealt with a Utah trust deed lien rather than a judgment lien, no
distinction on the type of lien was made in the court's opinion and the rationale does not
appear susceptible to any different treatment or result for a judicial lien. See In re Sanders,
93 F.3d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1994), bankruptcy protection does not permit a debtor to avoid
a Utah judgment lien attached prepetition to property, since post-discharge and case closing
appreciation in the property or even retirement of principal will remain subject to the lien and
will enure to the benefit of the judgment lienholder, not debtor.
4.

Sittner's judgment lien was expressly preserved by a stipulation made with the
bankruptcy trustee approved by an order of the court and any attack based
on claims administration is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
In June 1989, Gildea's bankruptcy trustee filed an adversary complaint seeking to

avoid Sittner's judgment lien as a preferential transfer under 11 U.S.C. §547 made within
ninety days of the bankruptcy petition; that enables such creditor to receive more than the
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creditor would receive under a Chapter 7 case. The trustee must prove all elements of
§547(b), including that the creditor would benefit financially over the amount the creditor
would receive as a dividend from the Chapter 7 estate if the transfer is not avoided. In re
Meridith Hoffman Partners, 12F.3d 1549, 1556 (10th Cir. 1993). Therefore if avoiding
a judgment lien taken on property, would result in the property having no benefit or value to
the estate for liquidation purposes, then the requirement of §547(b)(5) has not been met and
the trustee can't avoid the transfer. Indeed the trustee's lien avoidance power under §547 may
not be asserted to generally avoid the affect of a judicial lien, but may only be asserted to
avoid the lien in connection with the sale of properties beneficial to the estate. Ernst v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 26 B.R. 959 (Bkrtcy S.D. Ohio, 1983).
Sittner's judgment was entered within ninety days of Gildea's bankruptcy petition and
the creation of the judgment lien would constitute a transfer the trustee would be entitled to
avoid under §547, upon any real property that would be of benefit to the estate. Therefore,
Sittner and the trustee entered into a settlement "Stipulation" [copy Appdx. 8], which
provided the following:
1.
The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives any right to assert a
secured claim in and to any property of this estate or any funds which
constitute proceeds of property of this estate and acknowledges that any and
all claim he has is an unsecured, prepetition claim. Defendant's rights
respecting property abandoned by the estate or not administered by
closing are preserved and unaffected hereby. [Emphasis added].
2.
This case will be dismissed with prejudice after Court approval
of the Stipulation.
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The trustee obtained court approval and an order dismissing the adversary proceeding with
prejudice under the terms of the Stipulation.
Despite the contrary contentions of Defendants, the Stipulation is not ambiguous, it
quite clearly waives Sittner's judgment lien against any property or proceeds of property of
benefit to the estate, but preserves and leaves unaffected his judgment lien attached to
property of no benefit to the estate and either abandoned from the estate or not administered
by closing. The trustee had expressed an intention to abandon the subject propertyfromthe
estate, and indeed this occurred upon case closing and the Stipulation and order of dismissal
with prejudice operated directly to preserve Sittner's judgment lien on such property.
The bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the estate. 11 U.S.C. §323 (a). It is the
trustees duty where a purpose would be served to examine proofs of claim and to object to
the allowance of any claim that is improper. 11 U.S.C. §704(5). Therefore in the trustee's
representative capacity for the estate, the trustee is the primary objecting and adverse party
and other creditors and the debtor are not generally entitled to object to claims in the
administration process. In rePadget, 119 B.R. 793 (Bkrtcy D. Colo. 1990). In re Werth,
54 B.R. 619 (Bkrtcy D. Colo. 1985). The debtor has privity with the trustee on claims
administration.
A settlement stipulation resulting in a consent decree or in dismissal with prejudice
under the terms of a stipulation, as was done here, bars re-litigation of all grounds for or
defenses to recovery between the parties or their privies on all issues that were or reasonably
should have been litigated in connection with the matter, under the doctrine of res judicata.
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Brawn v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127,60 L.Ed.2d 767,99 S.Ct. 2205 (1979). Therefore under the
principles of res judicata, Sittner's Judgment lien can't be assailed by Gildea, it was
unequivocally preserved and unaffected by case administration and survived and was capable
of enforcement in rem following Gildea's bankruptcy closing.
In addition under common law principles, waiver is the voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right, claim or privilege and the intent to relinquish must be
distinct and manifest. 28 Am. Jur. 2d (<Estoppel and Waiver9' §158 (1995). Certainly the
Stipulation demonstrates that Sittner had no intention of waiving his Judgment lien on
property abandoned subject to his lien.
C.

SITTNER'S JUDGMENT LIEN AND EXECUTION
PROCEEDINGS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.

The Utah judgment statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(1) provides: "Judgments shall
continue for eight years unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment
is stayed in accordance with law."
Therefore the judgment against Gildea entered and docketed November 25, 1985,
ordinarily would have expired eight years later upon November 25, 1993. Sittner
commenced this action on August 3, 1993, more than a few months prior to the expiration
of the eight year period without regard to any tolling or suspension of the limitation period
caused by the lengthy duration of Gildea's bankruptcy.
Sittner could have completed execution sale proceedings within the time period
remaining. But given the uncertainty created by the length of Gildea's bankruptcy, the chain
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of title appearance of a deed to a party, Schriever, that had not previously been in the chain,
without any exception for or reference to Gildea's contract ownership, it was prudent and
reasonable for Sittner to resort to the court to seek declaratory relief to determine the validity
of the judgment and the rights and priorities of the parties and to control or direct the
completion of execution proceedings, rather than boldly executing and risking interference
with the title or possessory rights of potentially bona fide purchasers.
So Sittner commenced this action and immediately Defendants asserted the invalidity
and unenforceability of his judgment against the property. Early on Defendants obtained a
ruling defeating Sittner's judgment and subsequently after the trial judge's reversal obtained
another ruling defeating his title and ultimately obtained a final judgment defeating his
judgment lien in March of 1997. But this time at their urging, the trial court included a
decision that the statute of limitations had expired.
Indeed the judgment signed by the court on March 25, 1997, states in %2 that
"Plaintiffs complaint against all named Defendants herein is barred by the statutes of
limitations ". But this is plainly incorrect, because the complaint was filed more than three
and one-half months before the end of the normal eight year limitation period. Nevertheless
Sittner must defend the statute of limitations and fortunately both federal and state law
suspend the running of the eight year limitation period during the time enforcement of the
judgment was stayed and prevented by Gildea's bankruptcy filing.
1.

Federal law tolls the running of the state limitation period on a judgment
during the time the debtor's bankruptcy protection prevents enforcement of
thejudgment
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In this case, Sittner caused execution proceedings to be issued shortly after the
judgment was entered. The sheriff had completed service of the writ, recording of the notice
of levy on the subject property and a sale date was pending, when on January 16, 1986,
Gildea filed for bankruptcy protection. His filing triggered the automatic stay provision of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §362(a), which enjoins and prevents, "(2) the enforcement
against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the
commencement of the case" and "(4) any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against
property of the estate".
Unless the bankruptcy court grants specific relief from the stay, 11 U.S.C. §3 62 (c)(1)
provides that the stay of an act against property of the estate continues until such property is
no longer property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. §541 defines property of the estate very broadly
to include any legal or equitable interest the debtor has in property at the commencement of
the case. Clearly then Gildea's interest in the subject property became property of the estate
upon his bankruptcy filing and Sittner's execution proceedings were enjoined and stayed by
the statutory injunction and no further enforcement of Sittner's judgment lien could be taken
until the subject property was no longer part of the bankruptcy estate.
Gildea's bankruptcy case continued for more than six years to the date of closing in
April of 1992, and at no time prior thereto was any relief from the automatic stay granted to
Sittner, nor was the subject property abandoned from the bankruptcy estate by the bankruptcy
trustee. Under 11 U.S.C. §554(c), any property scheduled in the bankruptcy case that is not
otherwise administered at the time of closing is by operation of this subsection then
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abandoned to the debtor. So the subject property was deemed abandoned to Gildea upon
closing in April of 1992, which then terminated the stay since the property was only then no
longer property of the estate.
If the eight year limitation period on Sittnefs judgment continued to run during the
bankruptcy case, then Sittner would be unfairly prejudiced having lost the right to enforce
the judgement during the six year automatic stay period. Fortunately Congress did not intend
such prejudice to occur and provided in 77 U.S.C. §108 for a suspension of state limitation
periods during the time the automatic stay is in effect. Section 108(c) provides in pertinent
part as follows:
(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy
law,... fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court
other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor,... and such period
has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period
does not expire until the later of—
(l)the end of such period, including any suspension of such period
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay
under section 362,... of this title,... [Emphasis added].
77 U.S.C, §108(c) is applicable to suspend the running of state judgment lien periods
during the period that the bankruptcy stay prevents enforcement of a judgment lien. In Re
Morton, 866 F.2d 561 (2nd Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit in Morton framed the issue and
its holding as follows:
This appeal presents a question we first answered overfiftyyears ago,
but which, because of our subsequent holdings and congress's amendment of
the bankruptcy code, requires further attention today: Does a judgment lien,
normally valid under New York law for a period of ten years, remain
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enforceable after expiration of the ten-year period when during that period the
property subject to the lien becomes part of a bankrupt estate protected by the
automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C §362(a)?
. . . We hold that 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) tolls New York's ten-year period
limiting judgment liens on real property until the automatic stay is terminated.
Accordingly, we affirm. Id at 561, 562.
In accord with In re Morton that Bankruptcy Code §108(c) tolls the period for
enforcement of a statutory lien during the period that enforcement is prevented by the
bankruptcy stay, Miner Corp. v. Hunters Run Ltd Partnership, 875 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir.
1989); In re Miller, 133 B.R. 405 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1991); In re APC Const, Inc., 112
B.R. 89 (Bkrtcy. D. Vt. 1990); Matter of Burger, 125 B.R. 894 (Bkrtcy. D. Del. 1991);
Major Lumber Co. v. G & B Remodeling, Inc., 817 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. App. 1991); Garbe
Iron Works, Inc. v. Priester, 99111.2d 84,457 N.E.2d 422.
Also in accord is Citicorp Mortgage Inc. v. Hardy, 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992),
holding that Utah's three month limitation period on a trust deed deficiency action was tolled
during the automatic stay in bankruptcy, saying:
Section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in plain unequivocal
language that a period of time fixed for commencing or continuing a civil
action unrelated to the bankruptcy proceeding "does not expire until the later
of— (1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after
notice for termination or expiration of the stay ..."
Utah Code Ann. §78-1241 bears directly upon the issue presented, and
its substance is wholly consistent with like provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
In similar plain and unequivocal language, the statute provides, "When the
commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition the
time of the continuance or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action." Thus, under both the Bankruptcy Code and
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our OWE statute, plaintiffs deficiency action was timely filed. [Emphasis
added] Id. at 557.
Because federal law created the automatic stay preventing the enforcement of Sittner's
Utah judgment lien, Congress saw fit to prevent the unfairness and inequity that would result
from shortening the life of the judgment when bankruptcy suspended enforcement. So under
Bankruptcy Code §108(c), the limitation period was suspended for more than six years and
such period is tacked on to the normal expiration date which would have been November of
1993. Thus Sittner's judgment was enforceable until the end of 1999 by operation of federal
law, well past the trial court's adverse ruling in March of 1997.
2.

The limitation period on a judgment is suspended by the Utah
judgment statute during the period enforcement was prevented by the
Gildea bankruptcy stay.
As already pointed out, the Utah judgment statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(1),

provides, "Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously satisfied or unless
enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with law'' The concluding phrase is
susceptible of no other meaning than the eight year period continues unless enforcement of
the judgment is stayed, in which case the eight year period is tolled or suspended during the
duration of a stay of enforcement. This interpretation is also consistent with the general
statute of limitations tolling provision in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-41:
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a
statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or the
prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
Defendants may argue that the meaning of §78-22-1(1), "judgment is stayed in
accordance with law" refers only to Utah law and not to the bankruptcy automatic stay. This
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is incorrect of course, the term "stayed in accordance with law", includes federal law as well
as state law. In this regard, see APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670 (Utah App. 1996), holding that
the tolling statute for statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-41, which makes no
reference to federal or state law, operated to toll and suspend the limitation period on
foreclosure proceedings prevented by the bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. §362(a).
Defendants acknowledged that this was the effect of the tolling language in the Utah
judgment statute at oral arguments before the trial court on Schriever's third motion for
summary judgment [See Tr. 1644, p. 22-23]. But they argued strenuously and convinced the
trial judge that the bankruptcy stay under Code §362 is only in effect in a Chapter 7 case until
the debtor is discharged, and since Gildea was discharged in December of 1987, they
asserted that there was only two years of tolling and the statute of limitations had still
expired. [Rec. Tr. 1644, p. 23-24]. See also Finding ofFact ^[16 which states that the eight
year statutory period for foreclosing Sittner's judgment lien has expired notwithstanding any
tolling periods that could have been caused by Gildea's bankruptcy. However this is plainly
wrong since 11 U.S.C §362(c) provides in pertinent part, "(1) the stay of an act against
property of the estate under subsection (a) continues until such property is no longer
property of the estate;". Under subsection (2), the stay of any other act continues until the
earliest of case closing; case dismissal; or in a case under Chapter 7 the time discharge is
granted to the debtor.
In this case Sittner would be seeking to enforce his judgment lien by execution or
foreclosure and that would clearly be against property of the estate and there is no doubt that
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the statutory injunction then continued until the subject property was no longer property of
the estate. Therefore, Sittner's analysis and argument was correct before the trial court as
it is in this Brief, that the bankruptcy injunction tolled the limitation period on his judgment
lien for more than six years. So there was more than two years remaining on the enforcement
period when the trial court granted its summary judgment of dismissal with prejudice and
extinguished any possibility of enforcement by its adverse decision which is now on appeal.
3.

The Utah judgment limitation period is also tolled during a period
when the lienholder is required to defend his title against adverse
claims, thereby preventing enforcement or during the appeal of an
adverse ruling defeating his title.
In this case Defendants could still assert the bar of the statute of limitations on

Sittner's judgment despite the tolling of the limitation period for more than six years by
Gildea's bankruptcy, because even with such tolling the period expired at approximately the
end of 1999, and Sittner has been appealing the trial court's adverse decision extinguishing
his judgment and lien since 1997. It would be a most absurd result, if all Defendants had to
do to prevail was to assert the invalidity of Sittner's judgment lien from the outset of this
action which was commenced months before the expiration of the original eight year
limitation period, and then remain steadfast in their assertion of defenses to enforcement of
the judgment lien and to run over to the bankruptcy court and seek relief there if they get an
adverse ruling in the state court until finally the statute of limitations expires. Then they need
only assert the bar of the statute to prevail, thus taking the matter out of the hands of the court
and undermining the judicial process. This would be a most odious result and one that is not
sanctioned under Utah law.
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The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Capital Asset Financial Services v. Maxwell,
2000 UT 9,994 P.2d 201,204, that once a judgment lien attaches, a judgment creditor may
levy execution on the property or foreclose on the lien if called upon to defend against an
action to cancel the lien interest, citing Free v. Farnsworth, 112 UT 410, 188 P.2d 731
(1948).
In Free the judgment creditor was sued in a quiet title action (an action seeking
declaratory relief similar to the action involved in the case at bar) and by practical necessity
was required to defend the validity of the judgment in the action. The court said:
Respondent corporation deemed it unsafe to proceed with a levy of
execution while the judgment debtor's title was being defeated, and sought to
have the court control the sale of the property after determining the priority of
liens.
Id at 733. In response to the argument that the suit was not a foreclosure action by the
judgment creditor and that no restraining order or injunction prevented the creditor from
levying execution during the pendency of the quiet title action, the Free court said that the
practical effect was the same as an injunction. Id at 734. The court held that this was
equivalent to the judgment debtor preventing a levy of execution or sale of the property by
injunction proceedings, so the creditor was entitled to the same period of time before
expiration of the judgment as would have been permitted had the time period for enforcement
not been lost. Id at 735.
To the same effect is Moution v. Morgan, 202 P.2d 723 (Utah 1949) which held that
the judgment lien period was suspended by reason of the issuance of a restraining order
preventing execution upon the judgment that lasted for a number of years. See also Belnap
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v. Blain, 575 P.2d 656 (Utah 1978), holding that ordinarily execution proceedings on a
judgment is the proper way of enforcement, but that the equitable powers of the court to
foreclose on a judgment lien may be invoked when the judgment debtor has transferred the
property and it is possible that adverse claims to the judgment may be asserted, then the court
can control the sale of the property after determining the priority of the liens. Id at 700.
Free and Moulton establish under Utah law that when execution or enforcement
proceedings on a judgment are restrained or prevented by the successful assertion of adverse
defenses then equitable tolling will extend the duration of the judgment lien until the
infirmity or injunction is terminated. Under Free Sittner could not be expected to simply
issue out execution proceedings in view of the uncertainty created by the transfer to
Schriever and Gildea's long prior bankruptcy. Accordingly Sittner enlisted the equitable
powers of the court for a declaration and determination of the validity of his judgment lien
and for determination of the rights and priorities of the other parties and his judgment lien
cannot now be defeated by Defendants obtaining an adverse ruling and hanging onto the
adverse ruling until Sittner's judgment lien fully expires and is no longer enforceable.
Under Free there is equitable tolling of the limitation period which would be
applicable here, particularly given the series of adverse rulings and the duration involved in
the trial court proceedings. Sittner should not be prejudiced by the delay in the appeal
process or the delay that was caused before the trial court and the limitation period should
be suspended in accordance with Free throughout the course of the proceedings both in the
trial court and on appeal.
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D.

THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT TO SUPPORT AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
§78-27-56.

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 provides that in civil actions the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. It is under this statute
that Defendants' claim a right to an award of attorney's fees because Sittner didn't ultimately
prevail after repeated cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court first interpreted the statute in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d
149 (Utah 1983), and held that the statute was intended to be narrowly drawn and was not
meant to apply to all prevailing parties in civil suits. To safeguard against improper
application, two elements had to be established in addition to being the prevailing party. First
the claim must be "without merif which the court equated with "frivolous" or "having no
basis in law or fact" Id at p. 151. The second element that the action was not in "good
faith" requires that the trial court find conduct that is lacking in good faith. Thus the trial
court must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (1) the party lacked an
honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) the party intended to take
unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the party intended to, or acted with the knowledge
that the activities in question would hinder, delay or defraud others. Id at p. 151. In
addition, the bad faith finding must be supported by sufficient evidence that one or more of
these factors existed. Id at 152.
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In Cody, the trial court found a lack of good faith because plaintiffs failed to research
the legal issues as instructed at pretrial conference and had they done so they would have
discovered that no valid claim existed which caused the other parties expense and the court
a waste of valuable time. While the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's view that it
was improvident and unmeritorious and ultimately a waste of time, the Court rejected the
trial court's conclusion that their conduct rose to the level of a lack of good faith. The Court
repeated, that the evidence must affirmatively establish a lack of good faith and that it is not
sufficient for an award of attorney's fees to show merely that the parties or their attorney were
foolish in their claims. Id. at 153.
Even after the 1988 amendments to the statute which may have appeared to relax the
standards required for awarding attorney's fees, the Supreme Court in Canyon Country Store
v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), held that the statute was still to be narrowly construed
and applied only occasionally, saying:
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by an
insurer does not show the bad faith necessary for an award under section 7827-56. Notwithstanding the name given the covenant, breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is an objective question. As is true of virtually
all other contractual breaches, the intention of the breaching party is
immaterial. See Beck 701 P.2d at 800. On the other hand, the existence of bad
faith, which must be shown under section 78-27-56, is a subjective question
of state of mind. Footnote 6. Id. at p. 421.
In Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), the court reversed
the trial court's award of attorney's fees under the statute because specific findings are
required on each element to show that the award of attorney's fees was based upon the two
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prong standard of meritless claim and the subjective standard of bad faith and not simply
because the recovering party prevailed. The court again cautioned:
A party may bring a good faith action and not prevail. Failure of a
cause of action or defense does not automatically require the losing party to
pay costs. If we were to adopt such an approach, parties who had difficult but
valid claims would be economically precluded from bringing suit. Id at p.
1063.
Before applying these standards to Sittner's case, it is most important to note that he
commenced this action under the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-337, et. seq., for declaratory relief. Specifically invoking Utah Code Ann. §78-33-2 (see
Sittnefs Complaint f 18), which authorizes an action by any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or whose rights, status or other legal relations may be affected to have
determined in a Utah court of law any question of construction or validity. UCA §78-33-1
states, "No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the grounds that a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for." UCA §78-33-11 provides that when
declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the declaration. UCA §78-33-12 specifically states:
This Chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to
afford relieffromuncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and
other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.
Given the stated salutary purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, UCA §78-33-12,
that such actions and therightto relief thereunder are remedial and are to "afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity" with respect to the rights and legal relations, it appears
impossible to reconcile the intended statutory purpose with a finding of subjective bad faith
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for utilizing the Act. Indeed assessing attorney's fees against a party for seeking declaratory
relief under the Act completely thwarts the benefit and protection of affording relief from
uncertainty and insecurity and makes it ring hollow in light of the imposition of a penalty.
In like manner, what could the legislature have meant in adopting §78-33-1 that says no
action shall be open to objection, if the opposing party can merely object and the court will
impose a penalty in the form of assessment of the other parties' attorney's fees that are not
otherwise provided by contract or statute.
Sittner asserts that unless the trial court can point to some specific egregious conduct
during the case engaged in by the party who brings the declaratory relief action that would
justify an award of attorney's fees independent of bringing the action in the first place, that
the Court should rule as a matter of law that a declaratory relief action in accordance with
the Act cannot be equated with or give rise to either a finding of unmeritorious or subjective
bad faith. Or stated differently, resort to declaratory relief should be equated with a
demonstration that the party has an honest belief in the propriety of the action, doesn't intend
to take unconscionable advantage of others and didn't intend to act to hinder, delay or
defraud others as a matter of law.
In any event in this case resolved on summary judgment, there is no specific finding
of bad faith by the trial judge. The trial judge did adopt a conclusion of law, f4 that states,
"Plaintiff claims are without merit and not asserted in good faith" This is just what it
purports to be, a conclusion and not a finding and doesn't even suggest what conduct gave
rise to the conclusion that the claims were not asserted in good faith. This does not meet the
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standard for specific findings set forth in Wat/ass & Campbell, 808 P.2d at 1068. Moreover
the trial judge was disposed to grant attorney's fee to Defendants each time they won, as
indicated by the transcript of the hearings without any mention of or regard to a finding of
bad faith. The only thing the trial judge mentioned was that he believed the action was
frivolous or not well taken, which cannot be equated with the subjective finding of bad faith.
In this case there is absolutely no evidentiary or legal basis for finding or concluding
that Sittner lacked an honest belief that he had a valid judgment lien against specific real
property that survived Gildea's long-term bankruptcy case and that he was entitled to have
the priorities determined and join the necessary parties.
Of course Defendants contend that Sittner's judgment lien did not survive bankruptcy
and was no longer capable of supporting execution proceedings to enforce the lien, based on
an arcane and largely undisclosed theory of waiver during the bankruptcy case. How could
Sittner anticipate this defense, Defendants didn't even assert it affirmatively in their answers
and he still doesn't understand it. Nonetheless, as pointed out in Argument, Sections "A"
and "B" herein, Defendants' theories are contrary to the weight of existing legal authority.
It might even be reasonable to assume that since the trial judge had such difficulty
resolving the legal issues, having first granted summary judgment for Defendants, then
subsequently after further briefing and more careful analysis having granted summary
judgment in favor of Sittner, that this would demonstrate that the merits of Sittner's action
were not "frivolous" or of so little weight or without any basis in law or fact, within the
enunciated standard for "meritless" required for U.C.A. §78-27-56.
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Moreover, Sittner did not rush out and execute upon his judgment lien or take any
other action to directly interfere with the ownership or possession of Gildeas' or Schriever
in her claim to be a contract seller. Instead he commenced an action for declaratory relief so
that the court could make such determinations and protect the parties and afford the
appropriate relief Indeed Sittner made an informed decision to choose an action for
declaratory relief based upon the Supreme Court's admonitions in Baldwin v. Burton, 850
P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993).
In Baldwin the court had no difficulty affirming the trial court's determination that
Burton's actions in executing upon property that was not owned by their judgment debtor,
but instead was owned by a bona fide purchaser and they had notice of their interest before
executing, was certainly unmeritorious and without legal basis. Further in response to
Burton's claim that the Fraudulent Transfer Act permits them to execute and ask questions
later, the court held that a fraudulent transfer should always be established by declaratory
relief before executing or otherwise attempting to interfere with a transferee. But the court
affirmed the finding that Burton had a lack of good faith only because the execution praecipe
directed to the sheriff did not seek to levy merely upon the interest of the judgment debtor,
but instead named specifically the innocent purchasers of the property. The court concluded
this was wrong and that defendants had sufficient notice in advance of their wrongful act so
they demonstrated a lack of good faith. Id. at P.2d 1191.
While Sittner based on the clear and persuasive weight of legal authority, still believes
and maintains that his judgment and lien are valid and that execution proceedings would be
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proper and be issued; nonetheless, Sittner chose the cautious and prudent method of
commencing an action for declaratory relief as the Utah Supreme Court advised in Baldwin
v. Burton. It therefore is totally nonsensical and absolutely repugnant to the policies set forth
in the Declaratory Judgment Act and in Baldwin for the court to find or conclude that
Sittner's action lacked good faith or was frivolous as necessary to support an award of
attorney's fees under U.C.A. §78-27-56 for Defendants. Accordingly the trial court must
be reversed on this issue.
E.

THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN NOT
GRANTINGSITTNER'S MOTION TO STRIKE OTHER JUDGES'
OPINIONS AND IN CONSIDERING SUCH OPINIONS IN
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

After Gildea was successful in obtaining a bankruptcy order adverse to Sittner,
Defendants were granted summary judgment on August 15, 1995 of dismissal and an award
of attorney's fees. But this judgment was based upon the collateral estoppel/issue preclusion
of the bankruptcy order and indeed the trial court acknowledged that this was so in its
October 10,1995 order staying further proceedings pending appeal of the bankruptcy judge's
decision, and providing that if the U.S. District Court reversed or vacated the order that the
August 1995 summary judgment, findings and conclusions based thereon would be
automatically vacated and further proceedings could ensue. (See Order, copy Appdx. 3).
One of the four essential requirements of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion is a final
adverse judgment on the issue to be precluded. Glen Core, Ltd v. Ince, 972 P.2d 376, 381
(Utah 1998). Once the federal district judge reversed and vacated the bankruptcy order, there
no longer was any adverse judgment that could create issue preclusion let alone a final
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adverse judgment. Under the trial court's stay order, the effect of the reversal was for the
August 1995 summary judgment to be automatically vacated and that left intact the
September 7, 1994 summary judgment in Sittner's favor, that his judgment lien survived.
Nonetheless, Schriever ignored this and in January of 1997, filed a third motion for
summary judgment offering no new facts or legal analysis other than including the
bankruptcy judge's ruling and the federal district judge's endorsement of the conclusions,
and based thereon asserted Defendants' right to have the prior summary judgment reinstated
[Rec. 1061-1126]. Gildeas' joined in the motion [Rec. 1141], and Sittner responded by
objecting to the inclusion and consideration of the opinions and moved to strike them as
improper and not permissible [Rec. 1154,1160,1166]. Sittner cited Harline v. Barker, 912
P.2d 433, 440-42 (Utah 1996), holding that a trial court's consideration of a bankruptcy
judge's ruling, even if treated as expert testimony, was improper inadmissible evidence that
cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
The Harline court said even likening the bankruptcy judge's ruling to expert
testimony and weighing the admissibility against the prejudicial effect raises ethical and
public policy concerns and the ruling would have little if any probative value and is
substantially outweighed by prejudice, and accordingly each of the trial court's involved
abused their discretion in considering the ruling. Id at 441-442. See also Glen Core Ltd
v. Ince, 972 P.2d 376, 381 (Utah 1998), improper for the trial court to simply adopt the
bankruptcy court's conclusions.
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In this case the bankruptcy ruling and judge's endorsement were inadmissable as well.
Moreover, including the opinions in Defendants' memoranda and the court's considering
them was also improper under Rule 4-508 CJA, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unpublished opinions, orders and judgment have no precedential
value and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for
purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or
collateral estoppel.
Since the bankruptcy judge's ruling and opinion were reversed and vacated by the
federal district judge, there was no collateral estoppel/issue preclusion applicable and the
opinions were then merely unpublished opinions with no precedential value and improperly
admitted and received and considered by the trial judge. The trial judge did not grant
Sittner's motion to strike the offending opinionsfromthe memoranda and did consider the
bankruptcy judge's opinion. See Transcript oj Hearing [Rec. 1245-49, p. 4; copy in Appdx.
5] where the judge says, "Of course I've read the bankruptcy judge ys decision and as I say
that goes into the consideration...". [Tr. p. 4].
Based on Harline and Rule 4-508 C.J.A., the trial judge abused his discretion in
considering the opinions which is err. However, such err may avail Sittner of nothing in
view of this court's review of the merits of the summary judgment on this appeal for
correctness as a matter of law. Still Sittner expects Defendants to again reproduce extensive
portions of the bankruptcy ruling and federal district judge's gratuitous commentary and to
include it in Appellees' brief in response hereto, and this would be improper and should not
be tolerated and any attempt to do so should be stricken immediately.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The trial court's summary judgment and legal conclusions are erroneous and are not
supported by the law and constitute err and must be reversed. Sittner's judgment and lien
was not rendered unenforceable by Gildea's discharge and survived his bankruptcy case and
was not waived by any action taken in the case, and it passed through the case and remained
enforceable in rem against the subject property and it must be reinstated. The statute of
limitations on Sittner's judgment was suspended during the period the bankruptcy stay in
Giledea's case was in effect which was from the commencement of the case until the subject
property was no longer a part of the estate, and that occurred on case closing in April of
1992, and accordingly Sittner's judgment did not expire until the end of 1999, well after the
trial judge's adverse decision. Accordingly the limitation period should be reinstated so that
Sittner has the additional two years following the conclusion of this case to complete
execution proceedings, and this Court should direct that equitable tolling applies until the
completion of the case on remand. Costs should be awarded to Sittner.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of August, 2000.

12 A:\Remand\Bhef.wpd 1275-03-01 (C003)
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Appendix 1

L. BENSON MABEY, P.C. (#A2035J- '
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
—r^-fs^^m-fl
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 :.
Telephone: (801) 533-8505
Attorneys for Plaintiff John C. Sittner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN C. SITTNER
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

vs.
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY
HALE,

Civil No.

JUDGE

<73<??<3 < ^ 5 ~ TCy

JUDGE HOMER F.WILKINSON

Defendants.

Plaintiff through his undersigned counsel of record hereby
alleges as follows:
PARTIES AND SUBJECT MATTER
1.

Plaintiff is an individual residing in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant Karen H. Schriever

("Schriever") is an

individual believed to be residing in the State of Maryland and
is joined in her capacity as trustee of the Karen H. Schriever
Family Trust.
3.

Defendants

Bruce

Gildea

and

Shirlynn

Gildea

4

(collectively "Gildeas") are husband and wife and are residents
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Joy Hale aka Joy Hale Horsley ("Hale") is

an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5.

The subject matter of this action is a judgment lien

against certain real property

("subject property") which is

lying and situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah with a
common address of 2400 East 3000 South and more particularly
described in the Warranty Deed appended as Exhibit "A" hereto
and incorporated herein.
COUNT I
(DECLARATORY RELIEF)
6.

On or about November 25, 1985, Plaintiff obtained a

judgment against Defendant Bruce Gildea, et al. (the "Judgment")
which was filed and docketed in the Third District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah in Book 202, No. 1286 on November 26,
1985 (copy of the Judgment is appended as Exhibit B hereto).
7.

On or about December 30, 1985, Plaintiff caused a

Writ of Execution to be issued for collection of the unpaid
balance of the Judgment and in furtherance of the execution
proceedings the Salt Lake County Sheriff attached and levied
upon the right, title and interest of Defendant Bruce Giidea in
the subject property, by filing for record with the office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder a Writ of Execution and Notice of
Real Estate Levy (copy of Writ of Execution and Notice of Real
2

- ^

Estate Levy with recording information appended as Exhibit "C") .
8.

At the time the Judgment was docketed in Salt Lake

County, Defendants Bruce Gildea and Shirlynn Gildea owned the
subject property as joint tenants and were purchasing the
subject property under the terms of a Uniform Real Estate
Contract from Defendant Hale, as seller and fee title holder
(copy of the "Notice of Existing Uniform Real Estate Contract"
filed for record with the Salt Lake County Recorder on February
20, 1981, appended as Exhibit "D").
9.

Upon docketing, Plaintiff's Judgment lien attached to

and became a valid and subsisting lien against the one-half
ownership interest of Defendant Bruce Gildea in the subject
property and execution was properly issued and levied upon the
subject property by the Salt Lake County Sheriff, but such
execution

proceedings

were

suspended

by

the

filing

of a

bankruptcy petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah by Defendant Bruce Gildea on or about
January of 1986.
10•

As part of the Bruce Gildea bankruptcy proceedings,

Defendant Gildea elected to use his homestead exemption under
Utah law and Defendant Gildea for this purpose selected real
property other than the subject property to be exempt and
therefore said Defendant may not claim a homestead exemption to
defeat or diminish Plaintiff's Judgment lien.
11.

Defendant Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy case has now been
3

3

closed

and

on or before

closing

Defendant

Bruce Gildea's

interest in the subject property was abandoned to him from the
bankruptcy

estate, subject to and burdened

by

Plaintiff's

Judgment lien.
12.

From and after the date Plaintiff's Judgment lien

attached to the subject property, Defendants Bruce Gildea and
Shirlynn Gildea have been joint owners of the property each
having a one-half undivided interest therein and they have been
in possession continuously and remain in possession as of the
date hereof.
13.
Sheriff

Plaintiff now desires to direct the Salt Lake County
to

complete

the

execution

proceedings

that

were

commenced in 1985, but Plaintiff in taking steps in furtherance
thereof discovered the existence of a Warranty Deed dated August
3, 1992 (Exhibit "A" hereto) signed by Defendant Hale purporting
to convey title to the subject property to Defendant Schriever.
14.

Plaintiff believes that Defendant Hale was directed

by Gildeas, as owners of the subject property, to convey title
to Defendant Schriever in satisfaction of Defendant Hale's
obligation under the Uniform Real Estate Contract she made with
the Gildeas.
15.

Plaintiff contends that a one-half undivided interest

in the subject property was burdened by Plaintiff's Judgment
lien at the time of the conveyance by Defendant Hale to
Defendant Schriever and such one-half interest remains subject
4

4

to Plaintiff's Judgment lien which is a first lien subordinate
only to general real property taxes securing the unsatisfied
Judgment amount due to Plaintiff in excess of $30,000.00 with
interest accruing at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum.
16.

Plaintiff further contends that Plaintiff is entitled

to direct the Salt Lake County Sheriff to proceed with and to
complete

execution

proceedings

and

to

cause

the

one-half

interest in the subject property to be sold at execution sale to
satisfy

Plaintiff's

Judgment

together

with

all

costs and

expenses thereof and additional attorney's fees necessitated
thereby and by

this

action, the same being added

to and

augmenting the unpaid Judgement balance.
17.

Defendant Hale, having conveyed title to the subject

property with warranties, and Defendant Schriever, being the
grantee

under

the

purported

Warranty

Deed,

may

dispute

Plaintiff's title, rights or claims under the Judgment lien or
the Gildeas may dispute Plaintiff's claims and some or all of
the Defendants may have rights or adverse claims to assert
respecting the subject property.
18.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2, Plaintiff is entitled

to declaratory relief to be granted by this court to determine
the rights, claims or interests of the parties in and to the
subject property.

5

s

COUNT II
(FRAUDULENT TRANSFER)
19.

Plaintiff incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1

through 18 herein.
20.

On or about August of 1992 the date of the purported

Warranty Deed, Defendant Bruce Gildea with actual intent to
hinder,

delay

or

defeat

Plaintiff's

Judgment

lien

claim,

instructed and directed Defendant Hale as seller of the subject
property under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to convey the
subject property to Defendant Schriever.
21.

Defendant is related by blood or marriage to either

Defendant Bruce Gildea or Defendant Shirlynn Gildea and the
arrangement

for the conveyance of the subject property to

Defendant Schriever was for the benefit of the Gildeas and was
without any actual change in the ownership or possession of the
subject property.
22.

The conveyance or purported conveyance by Defendant

Hale to Defendant Schriever and the arrangements corresponding
thereto between Defendant Schriever and the Gildeas constituted
fraudulent transfers or arrangements under the Utah Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq.
23.

Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that

Plaintiff's Judgment lien is a valid and subsisting first lien
against a one-half undivided interest in the subject property,
which secures an unpaid balance due to Plaintiff in an amount to
6

<0

be determined by the court which is in excess of $30,000.00,
together with interest accruing at the rate of twenty percent
(20%)

per

annum

and

that

any

adverse

claims

asserted

by

Defendants or any of them, are void as against the claim and
interest of Plaintiff, as fraudulent transfers and arrangements.
WHEREFORE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS JUDGMENT UNDER COUNTS I AND II
AS FOLLOWS:
1.

For declaratory relief:
(a)

that Plaintiff's Judgment lien is a valid and

subsisting lien against a one-half undivided interest in
the subject property;
(b)
only

to

Plaintiff's lien is a first lien subordinate
general

real

property

taxes,

and

secures

an

unsatisfied balance due and owing Plaintiff in an amount to
be determined by the court in excess of $30,000.00 together
with interest accruing at the rate of twenty percent (20%)
per annum, and;
(c)
Defendants

that any rights or adverse claims of the other
are

extinguished

or

are

subordinate

to

Plaintiff's Judgment lien, and;
(d)
homestead

that Defendant Bruce Gildea may not claim a
exemption

to

defeat

or

reduce

Plaintiff's

Judgment lien against the subject property;
(e)

that Plaintiff is entitled to direct the Salt
7

Lake County Sheriff to proceed with and complete execution
proceedings and to cause the one-half interest in the
subject property to be sold at execution sale to satisfy
Plaintiff's Judgment together with all costs and expenses
of

such

proceedings

and

additional

attorney's

fees

necessitated thereby and by this action, the same being
added to and augmenting the unpaid Judgment balance.
2.

For costs of this action and such other and further

relief as the court deems just in the premises.

DATED this

ZZ day

of^Cj/^^L
>T

., 1993,

Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey
Attorneys for Plaintif

Plaintiff's Address:
John C. Sittner
682 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

:\wp\pleading\sit-gild\complaint.

84103

1275-3c-01
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EXHIBITA
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M. Fa« Paid U
. D«p. Book.
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Paj*.

Raf.i

XaO taxootic* to ra.u.TSJ

CO

Aonp

WARRANTY DEED
JOT KALE AKA JOT HALE HORSLET
©*
SALT LAKE CITT
. Co<raty of
COtfVEY
«dd WARRANT
to

SALT LAKE

, Suit

grantor
of Utah, htrrby

KAREN H. SQIR1EVER, TRUSTEE OF TOE KAREK H. SCHRIEVER PAMILT TRUST DATED
JULY 2 0 , 1992.

iTanU*
for tht iurn of
DOLLARS,

of
TEX AKD OTHER GOOD AKD VALUABLE CONS IDERATION
the following described tract
State of U U h :

of land In

County,

SALT LACE

Co«»encfng at a p o i n t 1966.61 f e e t South and 5 9 9 . 4 8 feet East of th*
Kortiwest corner of t h e Kortheast quarter of S e c t i o n 27. Tovnship 1 South.
Range 1 E a s t . S a l t Lake Race and Meridian, and running th»nct» South 300.88
f e / t ; t h e n c t South 82*l0*East 2 3 1 . 9 6 f e e t ; thence north 13•30* Vest 341.81
( e e t ; thence Vest ISO f e e t t o the point of b e g i n n i n g .
TOGETHER VITU *nd s u b j e c t t o a r i g h t of vay o v e r :
Co-^cocing at a p o i n t 1941.86 f e e t South and 4 7 . 5 2 f e e t £ a s : fro« the
Worthiest corner of the Northeast quarter of s a i d S e c t i o n 27, and running
th*nce South 4 9 . S f e e t ; t b e n c * East 846.25 f e e t t o the B r i g h t Young D i t c h ;
thence North 27*06' Vest along s a i d d i t c h 5 5 . 6 3 f e e t ; thence Vest 821.10
( v e t t o the p l a c e of b e g i n n i n g .

WITNESS, the har>d
AUGUST

cf aaW grantor

, thU
, A. D. 19 92

day of

3rd

fcijTvxi In tht Pr*»etkc* of
•KTY KALE HORSLEY

1-

STATE OF UTAH,
Cooatycf

Oath*
ptraooall/ a

SXLT

UKE

3RD

f

d*7 ot

. A. D. 19 g 2

AUGUST

JOT HALE AKA J0V KALE HORSLEY
w*nU who duly »da>owUdr*d to ma that

s

ha

txtcutad th«

Notary Public.

Hiding

KxvfLyxz cm, ITAH

0 4 PRINTING CO. — *»*t u u i t m

CT Ird

en
en
en
en
"D
O

en
cx>

EXHIBIT B
Sail Lu:.?-':<ii-.:'.'«r.r.h
•I
}l

25 1985

I'

'At* >»J O.f!. C ' H . » :

L. BENSON MADEY
YANO» MURPHY, WBGGELAND <5c FRIED LAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
376 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone:
(801) 533-8505
State Bar Number: A20 35

••^i.'*

IN TliE THIRD DISTRICT COURT CF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOHN C. SITTNER,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

-vsBIG HORN TAR SANDS <5c OIL,
INC., a Utah corporation,
TARBO, INC., a Utah
corporation, and OTS
RESEARCH, a Utah general
partnership, J. ROBERT
BRIMILALL, ARNOLD E. BERNEY,
BRUCE G I L D E A , PETER E.
BERNE*, DELL BRIMHALL, GARY
BRIMHALL, BERNARD BERNEY, H.
DELBERT WELKER and ARLON
MILLER,

Civi1 No. C-82-4804
Assigned to Judge
Dennis Frederick

Defendan ts•

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November
jj8, 1985 before the Honorable Judge Dennis Frederick. The Court
«»
• ' h a v i n g t a k e n e v i d e n c e and h a v i n g madt <md e n t e r e d i t s F i n d i n g s

i:
i!

of Fact
enter

and Conclusions

against

IS H E R E B Y G R A N T E D :

Defendants

Peter H e r n e y ,

and Gary Drimhall

with

the s u m of $ 3 0 , 5 9 8 . 3 5

together

at

percent

the rate of twenty

hereof

t h e r e o n , m a k e and

the f o l l o w i n g :
JUDGMENT

Welker

of L a w , d o c s , b a s ^ d

until

in favor

of P l a i n t i f f and

B r u c e G i l d e a , II. D o l o u r t

joint
with

and s e v e r a l
interest

accruing

( 2 0 % ) per a n n u m

from

paid anci t o g e t h e r w i t h a t t o r n e y ' s

of $ 3 2 5 0 . 0 0 and c o s t s a d v a n c e d

DATED this J&

day of

in the a m o u n t

f/W-

l i a b i l i t y in

fees

thereon

the d a t e
in the s u m

of $ 4 G . 3 0 .

, 198 5.

EY THE jCOURT:

Deputy Clft»x

i!

fiO.trO

EXHIBIT C

•9

$AH- I*** \v f y/

o

Ef

C*

*»

co
O

^O

2*

In iht District Court, .of the TbiW Judici^istif c&
la and for. Silt U&e;€ount)rf State of Utah I

418234?

jar:

3

CO

.Term. 19 85

HON, JUDGES OF SAID COUNTY
J6hn C. Stttner

Execution

Plaintiff
V*.

fltg Horn Tar. Sands & O i l / Inc.,
ee a l .

No..

C-82-4804

Assigned to Judge Frederick
DciJGiUPt

THE.STATE OF UTAH
To Xht ShcrifT or Coaiubfc of Sah Lake County, SuU of Utaf|, G.xctingi:
25
WHEREAS, Jtfdjtmeat wss rendered by this Coait in said County, wherein is the judgment roth on the
^iL.for'.hctumofS
3b,'59B.3S
46,30.
tnd s
co 6 iofraKsiJ>,-iP250.06
. attorney** fteft *ad the amount actual2>rduc 'hereon U $
$33,894,65
. and in)mart at the rate of^Sfa percent per annum frcm the
25 th
November
. A.D. 19
. until pvskl a$\um wu«i
.day of
Defendant Bruce Oildea
^

in rnvorof *aJ4. * l « i n t i f f ^ o h a - C .

Sittnar

S!
S

THESE A&E* THEREFORE* lo'cGiuawuvd $ou to coIVect t!*e aforesaid judgment aod costs, to^thct with tto con
of ib« eascuilofl. ami fhtt yev levy oa &6d KJX enou&h of the unexercised personal proputy, or if enough a wxen>jrt ed
p*rwn%f property qpnntt W foufed„' then oftonimexratpierf retf pcopirfty of the taid
••
k

Derandsut: Jiruco .Gtldsa

totttirfy••* igaavgiii AH Kfctf ccitt afcn*i*3 hen .*• ao$ iWa aHU t » . y « m i ^ ^
^y(C6)<^irw&^rtt^
Givfti im&r my ba»d t&* tfct 5&J of awl Cc withfe •^iLma^bL

lojtoESf, Aad withl*

_

NOTICE Of REAL ESTATE LEVY

E£KEB or im«

)

)
BS.
Sat* Uk$*Coy&lK Sheriff's Office
CODSTf OT S&LT I&PK )
Kotlc* U heraky given, thet un<}*r or/d by virtue of ft writ of EXECUTION
Issued out
th
°* * D1STR1CJ Court of the State of Utah, cf which th* anncwad I* e true copy, I have
this day attached end levied upon e l l the right, t i t l e , clelm and lnt*r**t of
BRUCE GILDEA,
defendants,
or either of thera, of. In end to the following described fte*! £st*te, ttsndlng on tho record* of Salt Lake
Cocnty, In the nene of BRUCE GI IDEA.
end particularly d*scrlb*d * t fellows;

1.

COMMERCING at * point 1988.61 feet South find
589.48 fact East of tha Northwest corner of
the Northeast quarter of Section 27, Township
1 South, Bang* 1 Eaat, Salt L*kf Base and
Meridian, and running thence South S00.88
feotf thence South t 82 •lO' 2aot 231.63 feeti
thence North 13°J0 Wast 341.31 f e c t j ihenc*
Wast 150 fact to the point of BEGINNING.
TOGETHER with 0hd subject to a right of way
over* CO&IKNC1BO at a point 1*41*88 fact
South and 47;82 feet East from the Northwast
cornar of tha Northaast quarter of said
Section 27, and running thence South 48,5
f e * t | thanca East 848.28 faat to tho Brighant
Yo^n? Ditchj thence Korth 27°0Q1 West along
said ditch 53.83 f e e t ) thane* West 821.10
feat to tha piece of BBOXRHINCJ.

2.

J.
4.

<X££JEHC1W3 83 rode South fcnd SOT.05 faat Weft
from tha Northeast corner of tl*s Hortheftit
quarter of Section S89 Tomifihlp 3 South,
Rangt 1 West, Salt Lake Korldian, and running
than** South 21.5 rodsi thanca Wast 40 faeif
thanoo North 21.6 rod*j thanca Bait 48 faet
to tha piftsa of
feagis&ing.
T*ia East 88 1/8 faat of Lot 88, Block 2,
aonuiiL FLAGS,
F a r a d Is £ta&i%nla& at a pointftl)dagraet 83
minutes Kast 86 fact froa tha Worth**st
aorner of Lot 2, Bltak 1 Xfogna Addition,
bainff in and part of Section SO, Township 1
South, Eanffe 2 Wast* Salt Lake Sfc*a afcrt
Meridian; and ruanlr,g thanca South 0 dserpsR
82 minutes ZMK 28 fawtj th«n®e north 88
dsgraas 83 lainytas East 124*6 fo«tj thanco
north 8 daffraas 32 raimitas tfaat 28 faat;
thahca,South fin d$#f«>*s 63 minutes West 124.8
faat to tha point of kaginains*

^
g!
^
D*

=•
_
ra
G3

k

2
Being the Ba*t'8i feet of V>t 25, Block 2,
Garden Lot Addition* an unrecorded
subdivision.
Parcel 2t The Bait 89 feat of Lot S3, Block
1, Garden Lot^Addition, en unrecorded
subdivision,^and being more particularly
described as foHowai
Beginning at a point North 88 degrees S3
minutes East 86 feet from the northeast
corner of Lot 1, Block 1 tUgnr, Addition,
being a part of Section SO, Township 1 South,
Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
and running thene© South 0 degrees 52 raiautes
East SB feet) thence North 68 degrees S3
minute* East 114.8 feet) thence North 0
decrees 81 minutes West IS feet; thence South
*8 degrees S3 minutes West 114.8 feet to the
place of beginning.
B2QIHH1HG at the Southwest Corner of Lot 1,
Block 77, Plat "D", Salt Leke.Clty ?urvey and
running thence Bast 45.8 fcetf thence North
S7 feet) thenoe Wfcst 41.8 feet) thence South
87 feet to the point of beginning.
Beginning at a point tthich is South 714.25
feet and West 38.48 feet frcra the northeast
corner of Section 38, Totmship 1 South, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Baca and Meridian; and
running thence South 195.00 feet; thence West
418.17 foet} tfcenca North 108.01 feet) thence
East 318.77 feet) thenee South 80.00 feet)
tfconce East 80.00 feet to the point of
beginning.
Subject to an (tzirtt&g fence line running
along; the above described property snare
particularly described as follows

^«tt-a:pfclht ca «.* *xi*ti*tt '.f#ne»
•*•''•
" '
6«$re«0 .12
. >r -_.,,...
,
, •f««t i *ml / Boutb
Ead^tP^feYia mitu.tc#.li.8«eo'&d^,^tt i s f«tt
Wf.'e;!, Ife8-f*At'^feridflo<Ath,«*V<J»ffC««630 talnutoa
lt;Heop&<lfest/3tf ;Jltf««t .tran.tW: ,
nortBiiact^irnaf o t S ^ c t i c a l f i , T&ra6hlp 2
8«Stfft iRftgt'gl;MftttySel t Lake Beta* sia<s
'H:tfiiBUt*S^«it filoQfeaia fec<i9MIii* 184.88
Zrtt"6Ma&tb* forth' 1/1 of Let 8?, Bleek 3,
AggBSB MAfr 06? KgNVB&'l&ACSi
AU.Of.LfcVSJ. 9tf&.GA&3$S8

V

>

i&&

J0CEKU<4*2t5

3536037
NOTICE OF EXISTING UNIFORM REAL ESTATE COHTRACT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to the terns and provisions of a
certain Uniform Real Estate Contract da tedFebroary 20, 1981 which was
heretofore duly executed and which now continues to be in full fcrce and e f f e c t ,
the undersigned parties tr^ t.\

seller

and buyer

of the fo 1 lowing described

tract of land situated 1n Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to-wlt:
hefjr t o Exhibit "A" attached
ht no and ry h i s reference
mode a part .tui.*eo£.

7i HALE

/

~
Seller

GIUDEA

Buyer

^<&Au%Jl<r>Yr> J&kfa+L.
CIIIRL^NN $tLDEA

)

STATE OF WfcH

COUNTY OF SALT IAKE )
OP t h i s
b e f o r e me

Bayer

20th

ss

day o f

Febru-iry

, 1 ? 8 L p e r s o n a l l y aupeared

JOY HALE, a s s e l l e r and R^UCE GHSSA and SKERLYW GILDEA,

husband and w i f e , a s j o i n t t e n a n t s , a s Buyers
the s i g n e r

o f the w i t h i n I n s t r u m e n t , who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t

they

e x e c u t e d the same.

' • . / ' ' My CQiim>t^ion e x p i r e s :

Notary P^>Tic - residing at
Salt Lake Qounty, Otah

V"\ FO^

J'
V

S

Mi

3

&i |

6
IV

ATCfH

FAHliJIT

"A"

COMMENCING at a p n t 1966.61 feet Sou'r, ana 5;9.48 feet
Ess*- of the B s r t h w o j . corner of the Northeast quaiter of
Section 27, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, and running thence South 300.88 feet;
thence South 82°10 t East 231.96 feet; thence North 13*30'
West 341.81 feet, thence West 150 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
TOGETHER with and subject tc a right of way over:
COMMENCING at a point 1941.86 feet South and 47.52 feet
East f r om the Northwest corner of the Northeast quarter
of said Section 27
and running thence South 49.5 feet,
thence Ea*t 846.25 feet to the Brigham Young Ditch;
thence North 27°06' West along said ditch 55.63 feet;
thence West 821.10 feet to the place of BEGINNING.

C/T

a

h

Appendix 2

Third Judicial District

SEP
L. BENSON MABEY (#A2035)
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 53 3-8505

7 199*

SALT LAKS COUNTY

,

Bv

Attorneys for Plaintiff John C. Sittner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN C. SITTNER
ORDER SETTING ASIDE AND
VACATING PRIOR ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
DEFENDANTS SCHRIEVER & GILDEAS
AND ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,
vs.
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY
HALE,

Civil No. 930904459 CV
JUDGE Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Defendant

Joy

Hale's

motion

for

summary

judgment

and

Plaintiff John C. Sittnerfs motion to alter or amend the court's
prior ruling and order granting partial summary judgment in
favor of Defendants Karen H. Schriever and Bruce Gildea and
Shirlynn Gildea, came on for hearing before the court on August
19, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m.
counsel

for

Plaintiff,

John

C.

L. Benson Mabey appeared as
Sittner;

William

D.

Marsh

appeared as counsel for Defendant, Karen H. Schriever; and,
Grant W.P. Morrison appeared as counsel for Defendants, Bruce
Gildea and Shirlynn Gildea.

Randall E. Grant was unable to

appear, but Grant W.P. Morrison acted with his permission on his

^sx

behalf with respect to the matters before the court.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action contending that he held a
judgment lien against certain real property, which Defendants
Gildeas

and

Defendant

Schriever have or claim

an

ownership

interest in and seeking, inter alia, declaratory relief under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 to determine the rights, claims or
interest of the parties in the subject real property.
Both Defendants Schriever and Gildeas filed answers that
affirmatively
extinguished

asserted,
by

Bruce

inter

alia,

Gildea's

proceedings and discharge order.

prior

that

the

Chapter

judgment
7

was

bankruptcy

After Plaintiff sent out one

set of interrogatories and request for documents to each of the
Defendants and answers were received, Defendant Schriever filed
a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's
Complaint and an award of attorney's fees and costs under § 7827-56.

In response Plaintiff filed a cross motion for partial

summary judgment that the judgment and lien were valid and that
execution proceedings should be completed.

Defendants Gildeas

responded by filing a cross motion for summary judgment seeking
the same relief as Defendant Schriever.
On April

26, 1994, the court heard

oral arguments and

announced its ruling that the effect of Bruce Gildea's discharge
in bankruptcy was to extinguish the debt which extinguished the
2

HSfl

judgment and lien as well.

The court also ruled that the suit

was not well taken and was frivolous and therefore the court
ruled that Defendants Gildeas and Schriever were entitled to
reasonable attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
Following the court's announced ruling, Defendant Joy Hale
filed a motion for summary judgment also seeking an award of
attorney's fees from Plaintiff under UCA § 78-27-56.

Defendant

Schriever's

counsel

prepared

fact and

conclusions

of

and

law

proposed

Plaintiff

findings

filed

of

objections

to

the

proposed findings and conclusions. However, at a hearing on May
18, 1994, the court declined to adopt the proposed findings and
conclusions, but entered a partial judgment excluding the amount
of attorney fees to be awarded Defendants.
Thereafter, Defendants submitted affidavits setting forth
their claim

for attorney's

fees and

Plaintiff

submitted

an

opposing affidavit and objected to the entry of attorney's fees
and filed a motion pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 59 U.R.C.P. to
alter or amend the court's prior ruling and partial judgment and
submitted

a

supporting

memorandum.

Defendants

submitted

opposing memorandum and the matter was heard before the court.
II,

BASIS FOR COURT'S RULING AND ORDER

The court determined that it was appropriate to reconsider
it's prior ruling granting partial summary judgment in favor of
Defendants Schriever and Gildeas. The court having reconsidered
3

Vl< .A

such ruling and evaluated the memoranda of the parties in
support and opposition thereto, determined that it's prior
ruling was based upon an error in law and that the partial
summary judgment based thereon should be set aside and vacated.
The court determined that Defendant Bruce Gildeafs prior
bankruptcy

and

Plaintiff's
judgment

bankruptcy

Sittner's

lien

avoided

discharge

judgment
in

the

lien

order

did

invalid,

course

of

not
nor

the

render

was the

bankruptcy

proceedings and the effect of the prior stipulation made between
the Gildea bankruptcy trustee and Sittner's attorney reserved
the judgment lien on the specific real property which is the
subject matter of this action.
Since such judgment lien was not affirmatively avoided as
a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, the court concludes that
under applicable case law such judgment and lien survived the
Gildea bankruptcy case and discharge order and is an enforceable
lien against the specific real property, at least in rem, and
that partial summary judgment should be granted in favor of
Plaintiff Sittner that the judgment lien survived the bankruptcy
and that execution proceedings could be completed or issued for
purposes of such judgment lien as against the specific real
property that the lien had attached to prior to the bankruptcy
petition of Defendant Bruce Gildea.
The court expressly reserves and makes no ruling upon the
statute of limitations period respecting such judgment lien and
4

reserves and makes no ruling upon any claims between the parties
as to priority of the judgment lien as between the interests of
Plaintiff and Defendant Schriever, nor upon the amount of the
judgment secured by the lien.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the court does now make and enter
the following orders:
1*

The court's prior order of partial judgment signed on

May 18, 1994 is set aside and vacated and is of no further force
and effect.
2.

Plaintiff's

judgment and

lien were a valid and

subsisting judgment lien against the specific real property
involved

in the subject action and such judgment and lien

survived the bankruptcy case and discharge order of Defendant
Bruce Gildea.
3.

That further proceedings may be taken by the parties

respecting the remaining issues and claims involved in the
pending action in accordance with the court's above stated
ruling and orders herein.
DATED this

/

kf^^J>&

day of

,

1994.

BY THE COURT:

/honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
/ T h i r d D i s t r i c t Court Judge
c:\wp\pleading\sit-gfld.\ord-set.8um

1275-3c-01

5
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L. BENSON MABEY (#A2035)
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-8505
Attorneys for Plaintiff John C. Sittner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN C. SITTNER
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY
HALE,

Civil No. 930904459 CV
JUDGE Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the date hereof,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the:

proposed ORDER SETTING

ASIDE AND VACATING PRIOR ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO DEFENDANTS SCHRIEVER & GILDEAS AND ORDER GRANTING

PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF, by depositing the same in U.S.
mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the following parties:
Grant W. P. Morrison
Attorney for Defendants Bruce Gildea
& Shirlynn Gildea
1200 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

MVrt

William D, Marsh
Attorney for Karen H. Schriever
One Utah Center, Suite 900
201 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Randall E. Grant
GRANT & GRANT, A.P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Joy Hale
349 South 200 East, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this

r1

Llday
day ofof l.WCIU.V.1
(llM.i W

1994

Kristi A. Jofgens^pn

c:\wp\pleading\sit-gild.\cert-of.ser 1275-3c-01

"M
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L. BENSON MABEY (#A2035)
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-8505

_ f L A K £ COUNTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff John C. Sittner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN C. SITTNER
Plaintiff,

ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS

vs.
KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY
HALE,

Civil No. 930904459 CV
JUDGE Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

Plaintiff John C. Sittner1s

objections to findings and

conclusions and motion to alter or amend findings, conclusions
and judgment and motion for a stay, came on for hearing before
the Court on September 26, 1995 at the hour of 8:00 a.m.

L.

Benson Mabey appeared as counsel for Plaintiff, William Morrison
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea,
William

Marsh

appeared

as

counsel

for

Defendant

Karen

H.

Schriever and Randy Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy
Hale.

The Court reviewed the moving and opposing memoranda

submitted by the parties and heard oral argument from counsel
for the parties and was then fully advised in the premises and

|0O°

ready to rule.
The Court acknowledged that its ruling at the hearing on
June

28, 1995 granting

summary judgment

for Defendants of

dismissal with an award of attorney's fees against Plaintiff,
was based upon the order entered by the United States Bankruptcy
Court on June 14, 1995 in Case No. 86A-20168, and that since the
entry of the bankruptcy order, Plaintiff moved the U.S. District
Court for a stay of the effect of the bankruptcy order and the
U.S. District Court entered an order on August 31, 1995 in Case
No. 2:95CV664C

(consolidated with Case No. 95-CV-613C) that

stayed the effect of the bankruptcy court's order during the
pendency of the appeal and review by the U.S. District Court.
The Court determined that the effect of the stay order prevents
issue

preclusion

based

on

the bankruptcy

order

until the

completion of the U.S. District Court's review and accordingly
serves

as

a

sound

and

proper

basis

for

staying

further

proceedings in this action pending the outcome of such appellate
review.

Based thereon and good cause appearing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law and

judgment signed by this court on August 15, 1995 are suspended
and fully stayed as to any effect and all further proceedings in
this case are stayed pending the completion by the U.S. District
Court of its appellate review of the bankruptcy court's order of
June 14, 1995, such review taking place under the case caption
2

loo\

John

C.

Sittner v.

Bruce

L.

Gildea, Case No,

2:95CV664C

(consolidated with Case No, 95-CV-613C).
2.

The Court directs that if the U.S. District Court

affirms the bankruptcy judge's order, then the parties shall
confer upon Plaintifffs objections to the proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law and if the parties are unable to
agree upon them then further proceedings before the Court may be
taken. If the U.S. District Court reverses or otherwise vacates
the bankruptcy

court's

order, then the

findings of fact,

conclusions of law and judgment based thereon shall also be
vacated and the parties may then apply for further proceedings
in this case.
DATED this

/

day of _

, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

T^T^c^L
lonorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Third District Court Judge

I CERTIFY THAT THIS fS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINS DOC'JV^'T
CN F'LE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT*.
,r '.TL.KE COUNTY,STATE

JTY CCURT CLERK
DeFUTY
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Grant W. P. Morrison 3666
Morrison & Morrison, L.C.
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7999
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774

MAR 2 5 1997

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN C. SITTNER,
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY
HALE,

:

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

:
:

Civil No. 930904459cv

:

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on defendant
Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea's Motion to Reinstate Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered August 15, 1995, and on
plaintiff John C. Sittner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on
the 25th day of February, 1997, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., before
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Room 502, Courts Building, 240
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. L. Benson Mabey appeared as
counsel for plaintiff John C. Sittner. William D. Marsh appeared as
counsel for Defendant karen H. Schriever. Grant W. P. Morrison
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, and
Randall E. Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy Hale. The
1

court having heard and considered oral arguments of counsel and
having read and considered the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda of
authority, exhibits and all other documents on file in this action
and being fully apprised in the premises and having read into the
record the basis for

its opinion, and having entered its FINDINGS

OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and good cause appearing, NOW
HEREBY ORDERS, ADCTUDGES, AND DECREES:
1.

Plaintiff's complaint against all named defendants herein

is hereby dismissed on its merits and with prejudice,
2.

Plaintiff's complaint against all named defendants herein

is barred by the statute of limitations.
3. Def endants are herewith awarded their costs and reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. The amounts of
attorney fees is preserved for later determination by this Court
and are to be limited to proceedings in this case and are not to
include

any

fees

incurred

in

other

actions

before

the

Bankruptcy Court or U.S. District Court.

DATED this _J~ ^

day of ^)

^^^^^O

1997.

BY THE COURT:

/

2

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

U.S.

Grant W. P. Morrison 3666
Morrison & Morrison, L.C.
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7999
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial D;si::c!

MAR 2 5 1997
- S A t I LAKE COUNTY
By

:

>'X<&\Ml>s.

^

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN C. SITTNER,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

vs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

KAREN H. SCHRIEVER, TRUSTEE
OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER
FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA
SHIRLYNN GILDEA and JOY
HALE,

Civil No. 930904459cv

Defendants.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

The above entitled matter came on for hearing on defendant
Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants
Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea's Motion to Reinstate Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered August 15, 1995, and on
plaintiff John C. Sittner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on
the 25th day of February, 1997, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., before
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Room 502, Courts Building, 240
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. L. Benson Mabey appeared as
counsel for plaintiff John C. Sittner. William D. Marsh appeared as
counsel for Defendant karen H. Schriever. Grant W. P. Morrison
appeared as counsel for Defendants Bruce and Shirlynn Gildea, and
Randall E. Grant appeared as counsel for Defendant Joy Hale. The
1

court having heard and considered oral arguments of counsel and
having read and considered the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda of
authority, exhibits and all other documents on file in this action
and being fully apprised in the premises and having read into the
record the basis for its opinion, and good cause appearing, DOES
HEREBY MAKE AND ENTER THE FOLLOWING:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about February 20, 1981, Defendant Joy Hale, as

seller, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Defendants
Bruce Gildea and shirlynn Gildea, as buyers. Under the terms of the
contract Ms. Hale agreed to sell and the Gildeas agreed to buy a
house and lot located in Salt Lake County at 2400 East 3000 South.
2.

On November 25, 1985, Plaintiff John C. Sittner obtained

judgment against Defendant Bruce Gildea and others in the amount of
$30,598.35 together with an award of costs, attorney's fees of
$3,250.00 and interest at the rate of 20% per annum.
3.

In

January

of

1986

Defendant

Bruce

Gildea, filed

bankruptcy proceedings in the Untied States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah.
4.

Plaintiff Sittner and his attorney L. Benson Mabey filed

a claim with the United States Bankruptcy Court as unsecured
creditors based upon Sittner's judgment.
5. During the course of Defendant Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy,
Bankruptcy

Trustee,

Duane

H.

Gillman,

filed

an

Adversarial

Complaint, under Section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, to avoid
the judgment lien asserted by Plaintiff Sittner alleging the same
2

constituted a preferential transfer in violation of the Bankruptcy
Code. Plaintiff through his attorney L. Benson Mabey thereupon
entered into a stipulation with Trustee Gillman agreeing to the
following terms:
"1. The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives
any right to assert a secured claim in and to
any property of this estate or any funds which
constitute proceeds of property of this estate
and acknowledges that any and all claim he has
is
an
unsecured,
pre-petition
claim.
Defendants
rights
respecting
property
abandoned by the estate or not administered by
closing are preserved and unaffected hereby."
6.

Plaintiff John C. Sittner thereupon secured payment of

$4,302.99 from Trustee Gillman as Sittner's share of distribution
to unsecured creditors on his claim of $36,228.73.
7. On December 14, 1987, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen
entered a DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR Order discharging Defendant Bruce
Gildea

from all personal liability under Plaintiff Sittner's

judgment.
8. On February 19, 1988 Bankruptcy Judge John H. Allen issued
an order vacating the Automatic Stay as to secured creditor Joy
Horsley (Hale) and the subject property.
9.

In January of 1992, Defendant Joy Hale sold her interest

in the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract to Defendant karen H.
Schriever for the unpaid balance of the contract as discounted for
cash.
10.

On August 3, 1992 Defendant Hale Conveyed and Warranted

clear title to the property to Karen H. Schriever, Trustee of the
Karen H. Schriever Family Trust, dated July 20, 1992. Upon purchase
3

of

the

vendor's

interest

in the

subject

property

Defendant

Schriever assumed Mrs. Hale's position as contract seller to the
Gildeas.
11.

On June 28, 1993 Plaintiff Sittner brought action to

impress the subject realty with a judgment lien "as a valid and
subsisting first lien against a one-half undivided interest in the
subject property", asserting said judgment lien had an "unpaid
balance" of $90,197.40 with interest accruing at the rate of 20%
per annum.
12.

In a companion cause of action Plaintiff Sittner alleged

that Defendant Schriever's purchase, from Defendant Hale, of the
vendor

interest

in the subject Uniform Real Estate Contract

"constituted fraudulent transfers or arrangements under the Utah
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 25-6-1 et
seq" and that the Warranty Deed from Hale to Schriever was issued
"with actual intent to hinder, delay or defeat" the judgment lien
claimed by Plaintiff Sittner.
13.

There has been no conveyance of any sort by Defendant

Bruce Gildea, of his one half interest in the subject property. The
Gildeas retciin a vendee's interest under the installment purchase
contract and continue to occupy the subject property as their
family residence.
14.

Defendant Bruce Gildea is not insolvent and he has no

indebtedness to Plaintiff John C. Sittner.
15.

Plaintiff Sittner's judgment was entered November 25,

1985. Enforcement of the judgment has at no time been stayed by/on
4

appeal and no action to renew the judgment has been undertaken.
16.

The eight (8) year statutory period for foreclosing

Plaintiff's judgment lien has expired, notwithstanding any tolling
periods that could have been caused by Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff Sittner knew, or should have known, that his

judgment lien and claim of a secured interest in Bruce Gildea's
estate was waived during the course of Bruce Gildea's bankruptcy.
Mr. Sittner stipulated to avoidance of the judgment lien in order
to participate in the distribution to unsecured creditors.
2. Plaintiff is not a creditor of any named defendant and has
no basis in law to contest any transfer of property by any of them.
Plaintiff had no grounds for suing defendants Hale and Schriever
for fraudulent transfer of property.
3.

Had

the claimed

judgment

lien survived the Gildea

bankruptcy, enforcement of the lien would have been barred by the
statute of limitations for foreclosing judgment liens.
4.

Plaintiff's claims are without merit and not asserted in

good faith.
5.

There

are no genuine

issues of material

fact and

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
6.

Defendant Karen H. Schriever's Third Motion for Summary

Judgment should be, and is hereby, granted. Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment should be, and is hereby, denied. All
other motions pending before the court, including motions to take
5

depositions and compel further discoveryf are rendered moot.
7.

Judgment should be granted against Plaintiff dismissing

this action with prejudice and awarding all defendants reasonable
attorney fees incurred in the defense of this action as provided
under Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56, as amended. Attorney's fees are to
be limited to proceedings in this case and are not to include any
fees incurred in other actions before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court or
U.S. District Court.
DATED this

day of

<*&^t~o^L-

1997

BY THE COURT:

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

\^35
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCI

3

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EB 2 0 199"
J 8 L A K E COUNTY
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4
5

JOHN C. SITTNER,

REPORTER'S PARTIAL

6

7

Plaintiff,

vs.

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
ON SUNDRY MOTIONS:

8

KAREN H. SCHRIEVER,

9

TRUSTEE OF THE KAREN H. SCHRIEVER

COURT'S RULING

10

FAMILY TRUST, BRUCE GILDEA,

Case No. 930904459

11

SHIRLYNN GILDEA, AND JOY HALE, :

Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson

12

Defendants. :

13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 25tn day of February.

15

1997. the above-entitled matter continued in hearing session in Courtroom No.

16

502 of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South, Salt

17

Lake City, Utah before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third

18

Judicial District, State of Utah.

19
20

APPEARANCES
L. Benson Mabey. Attomey-at-Law. Murphy, Tolboe &

21

Mabey, 124 South 600 East, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 Telephone

22

533-8505 appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff.

23

William P. Marsh. Attornev-at-Law, One Utah Center, Suite

24

900, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone 535-4659

25

appearing on behalf of Defendant Karen H. Schriever.

1

2

1

Grant W.P. Morrison. Attomev-at-Law, 1200 East 3300

2

South, Salt Lake City, UT 84106 Telephone 485-7999 appearing on behalf of

3

Defendants Gildea.

4

Randall E. Grant. Attomev-at-Law, 349 South 200 East,

5

Suite 410, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 appearing on behalf of Defendant Joy

6

Hale.

7

8
9
10

(Whereupon, the following proceedings continued in open

11

court:)

12

THE COURT: Counsel, I've spent considerable time on this

13

case in the last weeks in going over what has taken place, and my actions in it.

14

It appears this court has waivered somewhat as far as its decision in the case,

15

and maybe caused some concern.

16

Of course I don't think that what Mr. Mabey says as far as

17

collateral estoppel is the only condition under which I granted the summary

18

judgment of August 15th, although there's no question that the bankruptcy court

19

had taken a stand on the case, and I felt they had more jurisdiction than this

20

court did.

21

It appears that the federal district judge who dealt with the

22

question said the state court should make the decision on it, and that's fine; I

23

have no problem with that. It's before me.

24
25

I'm going to make a decision, and this is notwithstanding the
other decision that may have been made in this case.

1

I'm going to grant to the defendant their third motion for

2

summary judgment. I think it is well-taken. It was the way the court reasoned

3

earlier, and the court reversed itself. I'm persuaded, as I pulled the cases and

4

looked at them, and I'm also persuaded - and I did not rule on the statute of

5

limitations before - that what counsel has said, counsel for the defendant, as far

6

as the statute of limitations, the limitation has run on this, and the court is

7

granting the motion for summary judgment on the merits of the case as well as

8

the statute of limitations, and also awarding attorneys fees and costs to the

9

defendant.

10

Now, with this ruling, I know that there are four, five, six

11

other motions, as far as motions to take depositions and motions to compel and

12

motions for further discovery and so forth. I think all of those become moot.

13

Now, if you think I have to go down each one of those, and

14

rule on them, I will. I don't think it's necessary. I think all the other motions are

15

moot in the case and I think that disposes of the case as far as this level is

16

concerned.

17

Now, as I say, I have awarded attorneys fees. I remember

18

the last time we talked about them, but I'm going to award a reasonable

19

attorneys fee, and I expect counsel to be reasonable. I want attorneys fees only

20

for what has taken place in this case, not the case in the federal district court.

21

Those are not attorneys fees awardable by this particular court.

22

Now, I would anticipate that the attorneys fees are going to

23

be higher than they should be because of the fact that they have been back and

24

forth in this court, and that concerns me. I'm sorry for it, but that's the way it falls

25

at this point. Any questions?

1

MR. MABEY: Your Honor, did you state the reason for your

2

granting was - not the statute of limitations; I understand that - but you also

3

granted the third motion for summary judgment for other reasons?

4

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

5

MR. MABEY: I take it that you're basing that on the opinion

6

of the bankruptcy judge?

7

THE COURT: No, no. I'm basing that on the merits of the

8

case. Of course I've read the bankruptcy judge's decision, and, as I say, that

9

goes into the consideration, but no, I have gone back, I have pulled this matter

10

and looked at the cases, and I'm ruling on the merits.

11
12

MR. MABEY: And that judgment was waived in the prior
bankruptcy case.

13

THE COURT: Yes, yes.

14

MR. MABEY: Okay.

15

MR. GRANT: Your Honor, you mentioned "the defendants."

16

You're including Joy Hale in that.

17

THE COURT: I am. Who's going to prepare the pleadings?

18

MR. MORRISON: I'll prepare it, excuse me, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

20

MR. MORRISON: Thank you, your Honor.

21

(Whereupon, at the approximate hour of 8:40 a.m., the

22

instant proceedings came to a close.)

23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

6
7

I, Ed Midgley, Official Court Reporter in the Third Judicial

8

District, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing

9

proceedings were, by me, stenographically reported at the times and places

10

herein set forth; that said report was, by me subsequently reduced to printed

11

form, consisting of the enumerated pages hereinbefore appearing; and that said

12

report so transcribed constitutes a true and correct transcription of testimony

13

given, evidence adduced and/or proceedings had as in the foregoing transcript

14

hereinabove appended; portion only of entire proceedings being herein

15

transcribed, pursuant to requested transcript content.

16
17

To which certification I hereby set my hand this 26th day of
February, 1997, at Salt Lake City.

18
19
20

'jur*
^

-

•

v

21

Ed Midgley, Official Court Reporter

22
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

John C. Sittner,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

No. 981776

v.
Karen H. Schriever, Trustee of
the Karen H. Schriever Family
Trust; Bruce Gildea; Shirlynn
Gildea; and Joy Hale,
Defendants and Respondents.

F I L E D
May 1 9 ,

2000

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys:

L. Benson Mabey, Salt Lake City, for Sittner
William D. Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Schriever
Grant W. P. Morrison, Salt Lake City, for the Gildeas
Randall E. Grant, Salt Lake City, for Hale

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice:
II
Plaintiff John Sittner seeks review of the court of
appeals' denial of his petition for rehearing of a decision that
dismissed Sittner's appeal as untimely.
BACKGROUND
f2
This case arises from a judgment that John Sittner
obtained against Bruce Gildea in November 1985 and a judgment
lien Sittner thereafter filed upon Gildea's real property. In
January 1986, Gildea filed a bankruptcy petition, which suspended
the execution sale of his property. After the bankruptcy
proceedings concluded, Gildea remained in possession of the
property.

13
Sittner then filed a declaratory judgment action in the
district court against Gildea and others (collectively,
"defendants") who allegedly possessed an interest in the subject
property. Sittner sought a declaration that his judgment lien
was still attached to the property and that he was entitled to
complete the execution sale. Defendants argued that Sittner's
lien did not survive Gildea's discharge in bankruptcy. Sittner
and defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which resulted
in a series of judgments not pertinent to this appeal.
14
On March 25, 1997, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants. Concluding that Sittner's
judgment lien did not survive the bankruptcy, the court dismissed
Sittner's complaint and ordered Sittner to pay defendants' costs
and reasonable attorney fees. The court expressly reserved the
amount of attorney fees for later determination.
15
At a fee hearing on June 11, 1997, the parties
submitted to the trial court that they intended to stipulate to
the amount of attorney fees. Sittner would not stipulate,
however, to defendants' entitlement to attorney fees. The trial
court requested that defendant Karen Schriever's counsel,
William M. Marsh, prepare an appropriate stipulation along with a
judgment to supplement the original March 25 judgment,
incorporating the stipulated amount of attorney fees to be
awarded to defendants. Marsh prepared the stipulation and
presented it to Sittner's counsel, Lynn Benson Mabey, for review.
Mabey made and initialed handwritten changes to the stipulation
and signed the appended signature page.
16
Thereafter, Marsh created a revised typewritten copy of
the stipulation that incorporated some, but not all, of Mabey's
handwritten, changes and included additional material that was not
present in the original stipulation. Marsh then appended to the
second stipulation the signature page from the original
stipulation that Mabey had signed and filed it with the court
along with a corresponding supplemental judgment specifying the
amount of attorney fees to be awarded. Marsh did not provide a
copy of this second stipulation to Mabey. The trial court signed
the supplemental judgment specifying the fee award on June 27,
1997.
17
On July 25, 1997, Sittner moved, pursuant to rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,1 to vacate the stipulation

1

This rule states in pertinent part:
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(Continued on next page.)
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2

and the June 27 supplemental judgment that proceeded from it.
Sittner alleged as the basis for his rule 60(b) motion that Marsh
had fraudulently altered the stipulation. On the same basis,
Sittner also moved for sanctions against Marsh pursuant to
rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
58
While Sittner's rule 60(b) motion was pending, Sittner
requested from the trial court two fifteen-day extensions of the
time for filing a notice of appeal from the June 27 supplemental
judgment.2 The court granted both requests, on July 28 and
August 11, respectively, and extended the time for filing an
appeal to August 26, 1997. Sittner did not file a notice of
appeal before the August 26 deadline.
59
On August 25, 1997, the day before the time for filing
an appeal was to expire, the court held an informal hearing with
Mabey and Marsh in the form of a telephone conference. Marsh
conceded that the original stipulation with Mabey's handwritten
revisions was the stipulation to which the parties had agreed.
The court stated that, prior to making a decision on the
rule 60 (b) motion, it would be necessary to compare the original
stipulation including the handwritten revisions with the second
stipulation filed by Marsh. The court directed Mabey to submit a
redlined copy of the stipulation highlighting the differences
between the two stipulations. The court concluded in the course
of the hearing that it would be appropriate to vacate the June 27
supplemental judgment pending further consideration of Sittner's
rule 60(b) motion, and requested that Mabey prepare an
appropriate order. On September 29, 1997, this order was
1

(Footnote continued.)

(b) . . . .
On motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of
an adverse party . . . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
2

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(e) permits the trial
court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, to
extend the time for filing a notice of appeal up to an additional
thirty days.
3
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entered, vacating the June 27 supplemental judgment, which fixed
the amount of attorney fees, but leaving intact the March 25
judgment dismissing Sittner's complaint and awarding attorney
fees.
110 On October 21, 1997, after considering Sittner's
rule 60(b) motion, his motion for rule 11 sanctions, and his
submission of the changes made to the stipulation, the court
entered an order (1) denying the motion to set aside the
stipulation, provided that the stipulation be corrected to
conform with the language to which the parties originally agreed,
and (2) denying the motion for rule 11 sanctions.3 In addition,
the court issued a new supplemental judgment awarding attorney
fees. This October 21 supplemental judgment, based on the
corrected stipulation, fixed the amount of attorney fee^ to be
awarded to defendants.
ill Finally, on November 14, 1997, Sittner filed a notice
of appeal in which he stated that his appeal was from "the entire
judgment, including the Summary Judgment entered March 25, 1997."
Sittner's appeal was transferred to the court of appeals, which
filed a memorandum decision dismissing Sittner's appeal as
untimely. The court of appeals based its dismissal upon Taylor
v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), which held that an
order is final "even though the issue of the amount of fees to be
awarded [is] still pending before the trial court as of the date
the notice of appeal was filed." Id. at 928. The court of
appeals reasoned that under Taylor, Sittner was precluded from
appealing the March 25 judgment because he did not file a
separate notice of appeal within thirty days of that judgment.
Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that Sittner was not
entitled to appeal the June 27 supplemental judgment because his
rule 60(b) motion did not toll the time for filing an appeal from
that judgment. After the court of appeals dismissed, Sittner
filed a petition for rehearing which the court of appeals denied.
H12 Before this court on certiorari, Sittner seeks reversal
of the court of appeals' ruling. He argues that (1) this court
should expressly overrule Taylor; (2) the notice of appeal was
properly filed from the October 21 supplemental judgment;
(3) this court can now reach the merits of this case; and

3

In this order, the trial court also "affirmed" the
September 29 order vacating the June 27 supplemental judgment,
apparently upon the belief that it was necessary to do so because
the September 29 order was entered "pending further review" of
Sittner's rule 60(b) motion.
No. 981776
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(4) sanctions should be imposed against Marsh and damages awarded
to Sittner.
513 Defendants contend that (1) under Taylor, Sittner
failed to timely appeal from the March 25 judgment; (2) even
disregarding Taylor, Sittner's appeal was untimely because he
failed to file a separate notice of appeal from the June 27
supplemental judgment; (3) Sittner failed to preserve below the
issues he raises on appeal; (4) defendants are entitled to
damages because Sittner's appeal is frivolous; and (5) sanctions
should be imposed against Mabey for making false representations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
514 " x 0n certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court.'" Bear River Hut.
Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 14, 978 P.2d 460 (quoting State v.
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995)). We review the court of
appeals' legal conclusions for correctness and grant them no
deference. See Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 510, 984 P.2d 987.
ANALYSIS
I.

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES

515 Before we examine the court of appeals' decision, we
must resolve whether Sittner failed to preserve below the issues
he now raises on appeal. Defendants contend that to preserve the
right to appeal from the March 25 judgment or the June 27
supplemental judgment, it was necessary for Sittner to file postjudgment motions with the trial court specifically objecting to
those judgments. We disagree.
116 Defendants correctly state the general rule that
failure to raise an argument before the trial court precludes a
party from raising that argument on appeal. See Malibu Inv. Co.
v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, 134, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. However, this
rule does not require a party to file a post-judgment motion
before the trial court as a prerequisite to filing an appeal.
See, e.g., Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam) (XN>It is settled that . . . a rule 59 motion is [not] a
condition precedent to appeal from final judgment.'" (quoting
Nature Conservancy v. Nakila, 671 P.2d 1025, 1035 (Haw. Ct. App.
1983))).
117 The primary issue in the instant case is whether
Sittner's notice of appeal was timely filed. It would be absurd
to require Sittner to raise such an issue of appellate procedure
before the trial court, which would have lacked authority and
5

No. 981776

jurisdiction to decide the issue. Moreover, the merits of
Sittner's appeal, which we do not address today, can be
summarized as two issues: (1) whether the trial court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and (2) whether
defendants are entitled to attorney fees. Sittner's arguments on
these two issues are fully briefed in his own summary judgment
memorandum, his memoranda in opposition to defendants' motions
for summary judgment, and other pleadings filed below. He
therefore preserved below the issues he now raises on appeal.
II.

TIMELINESS OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL

518 We now turn to the primary issue in the instant case:
whether Sittner's notice of appeal was timely filed.
Specifically, we must determine whether Sittner is entitled to
appeal the March 25 judgment when he did not file his notice of
appeal until after the October 21 supplemental judgment was
entered.
519 We first examine whether it was necessary for Sittner
to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the March 25
judgment. The court of appeals held that it was necessary and
dismissed Sittner's appeal on this ground. The court of appeals
cited Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 927-28 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), which held that the time for filing an appeal begins to
run from the entry of judgment even if the amount of attorney
fees to be awarded has not been decided. The court of appeals'
reliance upon Taylor is nullified by our recent decision in
ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 386 Utah Adv. Rep.
27. We held in ProMax that "in the interest of judicial economy,
a trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees
awardable to a party before the judgment becomes final for the
purposes of an appeal." Id. at 1115. We thus overrule Taylor and
hold that under ProMax, Sittner's appeal is not precluded by his
failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the
March 25 judgment because that judgment—which failed to fix the
amount of attorney fees to be awarded—was not final for purposes
of appeal.
520 We next must determine whether it was necessary for
Sittner to file a notice of appeal from the June 27 supplemental
judgment. The trial court extended the deadline for filing a
notice of appeal from the June 27 supplemental judgment to
August 26, 1997. Sittner did not file a notice of appeal before
that deadline, but instead filed a motion pursuant to rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court of appeals held
that Sittner's rule 60(b) motion "did not toll the appeal period"
and that, even if Taylor did not apply, the period for appealing
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the March 25 judgment or the June 27 supplemental judgment
expired on August 26. We disagree.
121 The court of appeals correctly observed that a motion
filed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) "does not
extend or toll the thirty-day period in which appeals in the
original action must be filed." Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P. 2d
1318, 1319 (Utah 1987); see also Lord v. Lord, 709 P.2d 338, 338
n.l (Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("Rule 60(b) motions do not toll the
time for appeal.") ; Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) ("A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation."). Indeed, it has been noted:
An application for relief from a judgment
under Rule 60(b) . . . does not extend the
time for taking an appeal. Even if the court
hears and denies the motion before the appeal
time would have run, the appeal must be taken
with the prior period measured from the date
of the judgment, not from denial of the
motion.
11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2871, at 421 (2d ed. 1995).
522 However, the period in which to appeal a final judgment
is measured differently when the trial court grants the
rule 60(b) motion. Specifically, "[i]f . . . the court grants
the [rule 60(b)] motion and enters a new judgment, the time for
appeal will date from the entry of that judgment." Id. at
421-22. Indeed, a final, appealable order results "when the
court not only relieves a party of judgment, but enters a
corrected judgment so that there is nothing further to be decided
by the district court.'' 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68 [2]
(3d ed. 1997) .
123 In the instant case, the trial court informed the
parties at the August 25 hearing that the court was vacating the
June 27 supplemental judgment. Indeed, that judgment was vacated
within the appeal period, leaving no final disposition of the
amount of attorney fees, and under ProMax, no final judgment from
which to appeal. Sittner's only course of action was to wait
until the trial court entered a new supplemental judgment that
conclusively determined the amount of attorney fees. When the
trial court entered the October 21 supplemental judgment, the
amount of attorney fees was finally decided and the time for
filing an appeal began to run. Thus, Sittner's notice of appeal,
filed within thirty days of the October 21 supplemental judgment,
was timely. On appeal, Sittner is entitled to seek review of the

7
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merits of both the March 25 judgment dismissing his complaint and
awarding attorney fees and the October 21 supplemental judgment
fixing the amount of attorney fees, which together constituted a
final appealable judgment.
III.

SANCTIONS AND DAMAGES

524 Both Sittner and defendants have requested sanctions
and damages. Sittner requested before the trial court that
sanctions be imposed against Marsh for filing the revised
stipulation without Mabey's consent and without giving Mabey a
copy. Defendants now argue that Mabey should be sanctioned for
making allegedly false representations in his appellate brief,
and seek damages for an allegedly frivolous appeal. In turn,
Sittner argues that defendants' claim of a frivolous appeal is
itself frivolous and requests attorney fees and costs incurred in
responding thereto.
525 Because we review only the court of appeals' decision
on certiorari, we do not address whether it was proper for the
trial court to deny Sittner's request for sanctions against Marsh
for filing the altered stipulation. Moreover, we deny Sittner's
and defendants' additional requests for sanctions, damages,
attorney fees, and costs, to the extent their requests derive
from Sittner's writ of certiorari before this court.
CONCLUSION
526 We reverse the decision of the court of appeals which
dismissed this appeal as untimely, and remand to the court of
appeals for review of the merits of Sittner's appeal and other
appropriate action.

527 Chief Justice Howe, Justice Durham, Justice Durrant,
and Justice Wilkins concur in Associate Chief Justice Russon's
opinion.
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Appendix 7

IN THE

UTEO STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

T

In r e
B r u c e L.

Gildea,

j Bankruptcy Case No.

86A-00163

)

Debtor(s},.
)
PROOF OF CLAIM
Please print or type. Attach additional pages 1f needed.
1. Claimant's name and address: John C. S i t t n e r
350 South 400 East, Suite 110
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 34111

4.
5.

6.

The debtor was on the date the bankruptcy petition was f i l e d , and s t i l l i s ,
indebted to this claimant in the sum of $ 3 6 , 2 2 8 . 7 3
, which includes:
$ 33,394.65
principal ( i f applicable)
$
965.77
earned i n t e r e s t ( i f applicable) $18.57 interest per diem
1,368.31
other (explain) P° s t : judgnent execution costs and
$
attorneys tees
"~
The debtor owes t h i s roney because
Jjdspeat entered Navenfcer 25^_ 1985
A copy of any writing upon which t h i s claim i s based is attached.
The only security interest (collateral) held for this claim i s :
Judgment

The claim i s

• (attach writing, if any)
X Unsecured $ 36,228,73 plus $18.57 per diem interest
Secured*
$
Priority** $

$ 36.223.73
TOTAL AMOUNT CLAIMED
*The claim is unsecured except to the extent that the security interest
has value sufficient to satisfy it*
*Mf priority is claimed, state basis under bankruptcy law:
DATED:

5-19-86

Signatun

gftfrg^.

Title : M^JB&ISOQ rlabev. Attortfev for v,Lec

( i f not signed by claimant peWpnal
Clais Number
(for office use only)

MARKING: Presenting a fraudulent claim in a bankruptcy case i s a federal crime, bearing a penalty
of a 55,000 maximum fine and imprisonment of up
to five y e a r s . 18 U.S.C. 1152

°&
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Duane H. Gillman
Janet A. Goldstein
MCDOWELL & GILLMAN, P.C.
8 East Broadway Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3500
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
1

•

—

—

-

—

—

—

•

—

*

»

-

—

'

-

- - • — — — • « ! •

'

••

I

In re:
Bankruptcy Case Kusber
86A-00168

BRUCE L. GILDEA,

[Chapter 7]
Debtor.
DUANE H. GILLMAN, TRUSTEE,

Adversary Proceeding Nutr.ber
89PA-0220

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN C. SITTNER,

j

Defendant,
•

BMggggg""

'

...

i .i.i

.

J

STIPULATION

The Plaintiff, Duane H. Gillman, Trustee of the estate of
the above-named Debtor, and the Defendant, John C. Sittner, by
and through their respective counsels of record, hereby stipulate
to dismissal of this action under the following terras:
1.

The Defendant, John C. Sittner, waives any right to

assert a secured claim in and to any property of this estate or
any funds which constitute proceeds of property of this estate
and acknowledges that any and all claim he has is an unsecured,
pre-petition claim. Defendant's rights respecting property

abandoned

by the

estate

or not

administered

by

closing

are

preserved and unaffected hereby.
2.

This case will be dismissed with prejudice after Court

approval of the Stipulation.
DATED this

• in >h* ,?

p,ee c

/fl

day of August, 1989.

°.°y °< a document nn D u a n e

Cen.iiv C!er!<

H

' Gillman

X^C^ertsSrTffab^y 7
' A t t o r n e y f o r Defend
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CERTIFICA TE OFSER VICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of BRIEF OF
APPELLANT, through the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following parties:

WILLIAM D. MARSH, ESQ. (#2094)
One Utah Center, Suite 900
201 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)535-4659
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Karen H. Schriever
GRANT W.P. MORRISON, ESQ. (#3666)
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)359-7999
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees Bruce & Shirlynn Gildea

RANDALL E. GRANT (#1235)
GRANT & GRANT, A.P.C.
349 South 200 East, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)364-7777
Attorney for Defendant/Appellees Joy Hale
DATED this 24th day of August, 2000.
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